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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper uses the traditional sharpe and some modern ratios to evaluate the performance of Credit 
Suisse/Tremont hedge funds index in comparison to the equity, bond and commodity markets. As 
concluded by previous studies, hedge funds have higher sharp ratios, negative skewness and positive 
kurtosis than the equity, bond and commodity indices.  I found that hedge funds generally exhibit low 
correlation with the equity (but MSCI world), bond and commodity indices, even during financial crises. 
This makes hedge funds suitable for portfolio diversification. However, this diversification benefit may 
be minimized by the fact that the correlation between the hedge fund strategies are moderate, and slightly 
increase during financial crises. Also, hedge fund strategies generally exhibit higher correlation with 
MSCI World, Dow Jones-AIG commodity and Dow Jones corporate bond indices, than they exhibit with 
the other indices. 
 
Given the high degree of non-normality hedge funds returns distribution and autocorrelation of returns, 
modern performance measure were employed in ranking hedge fund, equity, bond and commodity 
indices for the entire period, during financial and non-financial crises. The sharpe ratio and modern 
performance measures indicate that hedge funds generally outperformed the equity, commodity and bond 
(excluding Dow Jones corporate bond) indices more for the non-financial and entire crises periods than 
during financial crises. Finally, evidence of hedge fund managers’ security selection skills (significant 
positive alphas) was found, except for managers’ market timing abilities. Also, hedges show low 
exposure to the market (S&P500 index) movements. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Problem definition 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to evaluate and rank the performance, as well as study the risk and 
return properties of hedge funds (Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund benchmark broad index) in 
comparison to the equity, bond and commodity markets. Is the hedge funds risk and return the same as 
those of the equity, bond and commodity markets considered? Can hedge funds play a role in portfolio 
diversification? Are hedge fund immune to financial crises? Do hedge fund managers exhibit market 
timing and security selection skills? 
The analysis part of this thesis will begins with the descriptive statistics of hedge funds and the other 
traditional asset classes (equity, bond and commodity indices). Their respective sharpe ratios, normality 
test, and autocorrelation will be obtained. Many academic researchers such as Kat and Lu (2002), 
Agarwal and Naik (2000), and Brooks and Kat (2002) found that hedge funds have lower standard 
deviation, higher mean return, lower skewness, and higher kurtosis. Also, a number of publications on 
hedge funds also found that their returns exhibit strong positive autocorrelation. 
Although some research have shown that hedge fund index is strongly correlated to standard assets, 
many came to the conclusion that individual hedge funds are loosely correlated to equity and bond 
markets. This makes them suitable for improving the mean return to volatility ratio of a portfolio. 
However, Lhabitant and Learned (2002) argued that diversifying a portfolio by adding hedge funds 
reduce positive skewness and increase kurtosis of the portfolio. Hence, it is a trade-off between profit 
potential and reduced probability of loss. The correlation between the hedge funds strategies, and with 
the equity, bond and commodity market will be verified in different market environment. 
Hedge fund industry has experienced huge increase in Assets Under Management (AUM of about 
$2.5 trillion by summer 2008) and gained interest of institutions in recent years. This may be due to their 
performance, even during financial or as supported by some previous research works, hedge funds 
outperform standard asset classes, and can serve diversification purposes. The sharpe ratio and other 
modern performance measures which consider return distribution or autocorrelation will be used to rank 
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both the hedge funds, equity, bond and commodity markets. The performance analysis will also be 
conducted periods of financial crises and non-financial crises to verify which asset class is better in either 
of the market situations. 
Finally, hedge fund managers’ market timing and security selection skills will be observed using 
Treynor and Maguy (1966) model. A number of studies have shown the hedge fund managers do not 
exhibit market timing skills, while others found evidence of significant positive alphas (fund managers’ 
security selection ability). 
 
 
 
1.2 Organization of thesis 
 
After this chapter, some theoretical materials about hedge funds will be reviewed, from definition of 
hedge fund to benefit of hedge funds.  Chapter three will present traditional portfolio theory, where in 
brief discussion about old and new performance measures will be made. I will talk about data used in this 
thesis and possible biases in hedge fund data.  In chapter five, the performance measures and ranking of 
hedge funds in comparison to equity, bond and commodity indices will be obtained. Concluding remark 
and possible biases will round up this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW OF HEDGE FUNDS 
 
 
2.1 Hedge Fund Definition 
 
Hedge funds are vehicles that allow private investors to pool assets to be invested by a fund manager, for 
which the fund manager charges a management and a substantial incentives fees which together amounts 
to 20% of any investment profits. However, some investment pool may possess attributes that are 
associated with hedge funds. Many hedge funds authors have defined hedge funds in different ways, due 
to its complexity. 
 
Lhabitant (2004) defines hedge funds as “privately organized, loosely regulated and professionally 
managed pools of capital not widely available to the public” 
 
Unlike mutual funds, hedge funds are exempted from direct regulation by the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and other regulatory bodies, and exhibits “lock-ups” (periods for which investors 
cannot withdraw their investments), hence they tend to heavily use derivatives, short sales and leverage. 
 
The main hedge funds characteristics and styles will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
 
2.2 History of Hedge Fund 
 
The concept of hedge fund is sometimes hard to understand. But we may know more about hedge fund 
when we look at the history of hedge fund. 
Many hedge fund authors believed that hedge fund was first started by the Australian Alfred Winslow 
Jones in 19949. However, Lhabitant (2006) indicated that the statistician Karl Karsten formed a small 
fund in December 1930 that looked much like a hedge fund, which generated a 78% return in just six 
months. 
According to Mario J Gabelli (2008), Alfred Winslow Jones formed the first hedge fund in 1949. After 
his 1948 Fortune article on the current fashions in investing and market forecasting, Jones discovered he 
had a better money management system. In 1949 he raised $100,000 (of which $40,000 was his) to form 
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a general partnership. The partnership; A.W. Jones & Co. was made of four friends (Allan Rappeport: 27 
march 2007) 
The main strategy used was long-short stock positions and healthy dose of leverage to protect against 
market risk. Hence, the term hedge fund was born. In 9152, he transformed the partnership into a limited 
partnership and implemented an incentive fee scheme of 20% of the profit for him as the fund manager. 
This incentive fee structure remains peculiar of hedge fund today. 
The attention of many wealthy individuals and talented professional investors was drawn towards hedge 
fund after an article in Fortune titled “The Jones’ that nobody can keen up with” as published in 1966. 
This article revealed that Jones’ partnership performed 44% above the best performing Mutual Fund that 
year, and 85% (net of all fees) beyond the best five-year performing mutual fund (Mario J Gabelli, 2008). 
In the year ending 1968, the SEC survey revealed there were 215 investment partnerships, with 140 of 
the investment partnership being hedge funds, and most of which were formed that year (Caldwell, 
1995). Unfortunately, after the rapid growth between 1967 to 1968, the hedge fund industry experienced 
big losses in 1969-1970 and 1973-1974 bear market. This was the “Dark age” for the hedge fund industry 
because during the bull market of the 1960’s, many funds managers were tired of using the long-short 
strategy; rather they were more heavily involved in long investments and levering up. Hence, were 
exposed to the stock market. 
Within 1969-1970 when the bear market kicked in, the market started to slide and many hedge funds 
managers liquidated and a 70% decline in assets managed by the 28 largest hedge funds (Alan Rappeport, 
2007), while the more prudent hedge fund managers made it through. Even more funds collapsed during 
the 1973-1974 recession (Sæbø, 2007), and 1984 Sandra Maske’ (founder of Treamont Partner) could 
identify only 68 hedge fund managers (Gabelli, 2000) 
Hedge funds once more became unpopular until 1986, when an article in Institutional Investors published 
the tremendous performance of Julian Robertson’s fund. According to the reports, Julian Robertson fund 
had compounded annual interest returns of 43% (net of expenses and incentives fee) over its first six 
years of operation (David A. Hseih and William Fung, 1999). This reignited interests in hedge funds, and 
also attracted lots of trading desk and commodity-trading advisors (CTA) (Allan Rappeport, 2007).  But 
on October 1987 (also referred to as the “Black Monday”), many hedge funds suffered hugged losses and 
Dow Jones was down 22.6% (Lhabitant, 2006). However, the market was fortunate to have recovered 
quickly and regained all the lost ground by 1989. 
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Unfortunately, the hedge fund industry went through some tough years in 1997 and 1998. Global Macro 
funds were blamed for the 1997 Asian crisis, and funds managers were described as “wild-eyed 
speculators operating outside government regulations” (Lhabitant, 2006). But the most remarkable event 
in the history of hedge fund industry was in august 1998, when Long-Term Capital Management 
(LTCM) collapsed. In reference to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) report, LTCM had $4.5 billion 
in capital but was managing $120billion (Alan Rappeport, 2007). LTCM specialized in interest-rate 
spread, dealt in swaps, options, stocks, bonds and derivatives. LTCM were short U.S. treasury bonds and 
long Russian government bonds. Unfortunately, the LTCM lost enormous amounts both on their 
positions. This was due to the devaluation of the roubble and the default on domestic debt by the Russian 
government, and flight-to-liquidate situation where investors preferred the U.S. treasury bonds to the 
Russian government bond.  The lost incurred by the fund was approximately $1.85billion of its capital 
(Wikipedia, 2007). 
The New York Federal Reserve in fear of the unacceptable risks of abrupt an disorderly liquidation of  
LTCM would have caused to the U.S. economy, orchestrated a rescue plan with 14 banks and security 
firms, and bailed out the fund with $3.625 billion (Lhabitant,2006). The fund was finally liquidated in 
early 2000 (Wikipedia, 2007). However, the main reason of the collapse of LTCM was its excessive use 
of leverage (over $124.5 billion borrowed with just $4.73 billion in equity). After this remarkable crisis, 
hedge fund managers agreed to induce more transparency and leverage reduction. 
Due to the 1997-1998 crises, the U.S. Federal Reserve cut interest rate which was favorable for the U.S. 
economy and the financial market in the proceeding years. This developed a Hubble that burst in March, 
2000. Hedge fund industry performed well although major indices performed very poor. Most hedge 
funds employed a mix of long-short, event-driven, and multi-strategy approaches, while interest in 
emerging markets and funds of funds grew as well. 
The hedge fund industry has dramatically grown in the past 17-18years (Figure 2.1). According to the 
2008 hedge fund Asset Flows and Trend Report published by Hedgefund.net and Institution Investor 
News estimated a total assets of $2.68trillion in Third Quarter 2007 (Wikipedia, 2008) and there are 
approximately 9,500 hedge funds managers (Hennessee Group LLC, 2007). However, the asset under 
management dropped sharply through the combination of trading losses and investors’ asset withdrawal 
from funds (Wikipedia, 2009). And so by summer 2008, the asset managed by the hedge fund industry 
peaked at $2.5 trillion (Wikipedia, 2009). 
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Large institutional investors such as Pension funds, Insurance companies, Corporations and Foundation 
will be the main source of future growth in the hedge fund industry. This can be exemplified by the 
allocation of $1billion to hedge funds in 2000 by California Public Employees Retirement System 
(CalPERS) (Lhabitant, 2006). 
 
2.3 Hedge Fund Characteristics 
 
There exist investments pools that closely resemble hedge funds which are regarded as different 
investment type. Hence a close examination of some traits of hedge funds will help us distinguish them 
from the conventional investment funds. 
 
2.3.1 Performance fees charge and targeting absolute return 
 
Hedge funds also differ from mutual funds in its compensation structure. Unlike mutual fund managers, 
who only charge management fee equal to a fix percentage of Asset (for instance; 1%-.5% annually for a 
typical equity fund), hedge fund managers charge both management (1%-2% of Asset) and incentive fees 
(20% of profit or more). 
Incentive fee is a strong managerial incentive which motivates managers to obtain maximum return 
possible. This incentive fee partly explains why hedge funds performance outweighs that of mutual 
funds, but without increased total risk of the hedge funds. 
Many hedge funds target absolute returns. This absolute return target must be reached no matter the 
situation in the bond or stock markets; that is the fund must be profitable. 
Numerous hedge funds also have an absolute return clause in their offering memorandum. This clause 
states a return floor (hurdle rate) the hedge fund manager must achieve net of the cumulative returns 
before they earn the incentive fee. 
Unlike the traditional investment vehicles whose performance is compared to standard market 
benchmarks, hedge funds target absolute returns (profitability) no matter the atmosphere in the bond or 
stock market; in order for hedge fund managers to be rewarded with incentive fees. 
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Moreover, to avoid managers with poorly established and executed strategies from being attracted by the 
high fees involved in the hedge funds management, most hedge funds request their managers to commit a 
huge portion of his/her personal wealth in the fund as do other investors. 
 
2.3.2 Limited Transparency 
 
Hedge funds have refused to disclose their positions or trade details to the public. Most recently, hedge 
funds investors have often requested information on hedge fund position and risk (Hans Hufschmid, 2007 
confirmed this). This limited transparency is due to the fact that hedge fund managers think the funds’ 
performance would be adversely affected by the disclosure of their specific positions or strategies (Veran 
Allen: 2006, confirm this). Also, on like mutual funds managers that are required by the SEC to offer 
total transparency, hedge funds are not compelled to disclose publicly their performance information, 
other positions or strategies. 
In recent years, the SEC oversight of hedge funds have increased and other financial associations like 
Investors Risk Committee (IRC) of the International Association of Financial Engineers (IAFE) and 
Capital Market Risk Advisors, Inc (CMRA) have taken a step towards striking the appropriate balance 
between disclosure of meaningful information to investors and protection of hedge funds managements’ 
proprietary investment knowledge (Alternative Investment Management Association Ltd (AIMA), 2003). 
 
2.3.3 Liquidity limitation 
 
Traditional Investment funds like mutual funds are examples of  open-end investment companies that are 
ready to redeem  or issue share at their net value  whenever investors (either on the same or the following 
day) wish (shares redemption or issue may involve sales charges). 
However, hedge funds being example of closed-end investment companies limits subscription to 
accredited investors, and  redemption possibilities by imposing lock-up (period as long as several years 
during which investments cannot be withdrawn). Also, hedge funds restrict entry or exit to certain times 
in a year (monthly, quarterly or annually basis) and often require advanced notice of investment 
withdrawal.  Some hedge fund managers charge investors redemption (when fund is organized as limited 
partnership) or withdrawal (if fund is corporate entity) fees if investors withdraw their money from the 
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hedge fund before a minimum duration of their investment in the funds. Hedge fund managers require 
minimum investment depending on their quality and reputation, significant amount of money needed, and 
lock-up periods. 
 
2.3.4 Target Group of Investors 
 
Unlike mutual funds that target retail investors, hedge funds target accredited investors and institutional 
investors. In USA, an accredited investor is an individual with net worth of at least $1,000,000 or has 
made a minimum of $200,000 in every of the previous two years ($300,000 with spouse if married) and 
expects to make the same amount in the current year (Wikipedia) 
Accredited investors are ideal for hedge funds since they have sufficient wealth to invest and commit 
themselves in a fund as partners in the long run. 
 
2.3.5 Flexible investment Policies 
 
These flexible investment policies also distinguish hedge funds the traditional investments funds. Hedge 
fund managers concentrate on investment and performance, rather than on cash management, and impose 
lock-up. This enables them obtain the flexibility to pursue other investment styles with an aim of 
outstanding returns (alpha), to invest in illiquid assets and other asset classes. 
 
2.3.6 Special Regulation Rules 
 
Hedge funds are organized in various legal forms, with the intension to prevent the numerous regulations 
levied on the other financial intermediaries and / or to minimize their tax bill, when the hedge funds 
invest on offshore hedge funds. 
Hedge funds are mostly organized as limited partnership or limited liability companies in the U.S. 
and offshore investors companies (corporation) established in tax-favorable jurisdictions outside the 
United State, so that the investors possibly receive dividends and capital gains or losses, and not flow of 
interest expense. Unfortunately, the US is stepping forward to restrict offshore tax havens and their 
abusive tax shelters. Moreover, hedge funds being investment companies are required by the Investment 
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Company Act of 1990 to register with the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), though 
exempted from numerous SEC regulation. Hedge funds are not required to submit to numerous regulation 
such as; disclosure regulations, regulations limiting the use of leverage, regulations requiring shares to be 
redeemable at anytime, regulation requiring certain degree of liquidity, regulations protecting against 
conflict of interest, regulations to assure fair pricing of fund shares. 
Furthermore, Hedge funds are not required to register under Federal Security Laws. They are not 
required to register under SEC because they sell ownership as private placement to accredited investors; 
they do not publicly offer their securities and are not allowed to make public offering of securities 
anywhere in the world. Conversely, according to Hennessee Hedge Fund Manager survey, 86 percent of 
hedge funds were registered with some regulatory body (such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or Commodity Futures Trading Commission) in 2006. Also, hedge funds monitor and keep 
the portions of their funds attributed to plan assets below 25% in order not to be classified as plan asset 
and to escape regulation from Employee Retirement Income Security (ERISA) which regulates the 
investment management of plan asset. With this limited regulations, hedge funds managers have 
tremendous flexibility in making their investment decisions. 
In June 1997, the SEC encouraged investment in hedge funds by allowing hedge funds to exceed their 
previous limit of 100 investors without altering their regulation and disclosure. This change in SEC 
regulations also accounts for the rapid growth in hedge funds in the past decade and will promote future 
growth in hedge funds. Although hedge funds are loosely regulated, the Federal Security Laws prevent 
them from abuse and fraud. Also, the US may increase registration requirement for hedge funds, and may 
step up regulation for hedge fund institution that can cause systematic risk to the US economy. 
 
2.4 Hedge Fund Styles 
 
Hedge fund investments exhibit less restrictions and managers employ a plethora of investment styles 
that much differ in approaches, objectives and outcomes. Although many consultants, investor and 
managers have classified hedge funds styles into more homogenous groups, there is no standard 
classification of different hedge fund strategies. 
The Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index is the leading asset-weighted index and has 
classified hedge funds under ten strategies. Hence, the classification of hedge funds styles by Credit 
Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index (benchmark broad index) will be used since the index will be the data 
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source of this thesis. The various sector weights of the credit Suisse/ Tremont hedge fund index is 
presented in figure 2.4. 
These ten styles include: 
 
2.4.1 Convertible Arbitrage 
 
Managers seek to make profit from the pricing anomalies between convertible bonds and their underlying 
equity by taking long positions in convertible securities (bond), and hedge the equity portion of the long 
securities positions, by shorting the underlying common stock. 
 
2.4.2 Dedicated Short Bias 
 
The fund managers focus on companies whose securities are overpriced (or companies with weak cash 
flow generation) and short the stock of these companies if they anticipate that the companies’ stocks 
prices will decrease. This strategy will be profitable if they later buy back the stocks at lower prices. 
However, fund managers offset the long positions to minimize the risk associated with shorting of those 
stocks. 
 
2.4.3 Emerging markets 
 
These funds invest in all types of securities in country with “emerging” or developing markets. The 
strategy consists of buying sovereign or corporate debt/or equity and other instruments in that country. 
Investments are mostly long since many emerging market does not allow short selling nor offer viable 
futures or other derivatives to hedge their risk exposure. 
 
2.4.4 Equity Market Neutral 
 
This style seek to make profit by exploiting the pricing inefficiency between related equity securities 
while neutralizing exposure to market risk by offsetting long position in underpriced security and short 
position in overpriced securities . The profit involved in this strategy may come from the purchase 
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undervalued security whose price is increasing, and from sales of overvalued security whose price is 
dropping, or from sector/country bets. 
 
2.4.5 Event Driven 
 
Funds invest in debts and equities , and seek to harvest  from potential mispricing of companies facing a 
specific situation in their life cycle such as; spin-offs, mergers and acquisitions, bankruptcy, re-
organization, re-capitalization and share buybacks. Distressed, multi-strategy, and risk arbitrage are sub-
strategy of the event driven style. 
 
i) Distress securities funds invest in debt or equity (capital structure) of companies experiencing 
financial or operational distress or facing bankruptcy, reorganization or other corporate restructuring. 
These companies’ securities are purchased by the investors at a discount, due to difficulties in accessing 
their proper value, fears of traditional investors to keep holding these securities and low market liquidity. 
The aim of this strategy is to profit when the securities of these companies appreciate after survival from 
the distress. Hence, the distress securities funds are long term in nature. Some funds managers hedge the 
risks associated with this strategy with put options on the underlying market, or may strategically be 
involved in the managing the companies through the distress. 
 
ii) Multi-strategy fund managers utilize multiple investment strategies across asset classes to better 
diversify their portfolio or to exploit the shift in economic cycles. The multiple investment strategies 
may include; risk arbitrage, distress securities and sometimes micro and small capitalization public 
companies that are raising money in private capital markets. 
 
iii) Risk Arbitrage (Merger Arbitrage) fund manager invest in event driven situations such as 
leverage buy-out, merger or acquisition. With this strategy, the fund will buy the stocks of the target 
company while shorting the stock of the acquiring company in order to capture the spread in merger or 
acquisition transactions. The risk in this style is breakage of the deal after announcement. 
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2.4.6 Fixed Income Arbitrage  
 
Fixed income arbitrage funds use a spectrum of strategies to exploit the inefficiencies and price 
anomalies between related fixed income securities typical strategies include yield curve arbitrage, 
corporate versus treasury yield spread, mortgage-backed securities arbitrage, municipal bond versus 
treasury yield spread, etc. fixed income arbitrage managers limit volatility by hedging exposure to the 
market and interest rate risk in their portfolio, and enhancing returns by large amount of leverage. 
 
2.4.7 Global Macro  
 
These fund managers make leveraged opportunistic investments in global currency, equity, bond and 
commodity markets on a discretionary basis (models). They employ a “top-down” global approach to 
focus on forecasting the effects of economic, political and market factors on the valuation of securities. 
Global macro managers profit by correctly forecasting global market price movements. Hence, the 
manager’s quality is the sole key to the funds’ success since they have large portfolio with heavy use of 
derivatives, and have to profit by correctly forecasting global market price movements. 
 
2.4.8 Long/Short Equity 
 
This strategy is based on investing on both long and short sides of equity market in order to diversify or 
hedge against market exposure. However, funds with either net long or net short positions are exposed to 
market conditions since they are significantly correlated with traditional markets. Also, managers have 
the flexibility to switch between the sub-strategies of the long/short equity style. According to Lhabitant, 
these sub-strategies include; 
 
i) Value 
It is an equity-based strategy where in managers strive to exploit mispricing of stocks. Managers profit 
by shorting stocks that are believed to be overpriced and taking long positions in stock deemed to be 
underpriced, given that the market later adjusts by fairly pricing the underlying stocks. 
 
ii) Growth 
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Growth fund managers may either invest in companies that have or is expected to grow earnings per 
share. These companies are mostly micro, small, or mid-capitalization in size since they will be in their 
growth stage. Also, manager that pursue growth strategy generally take short positions. 
 
iii) Market Neutral-Security Hedging 
Hedge funds managers that follow this strategy, try to minimize market exposure of their managed 
portfolio by equally investing in both short and long securities. Securities with expected price decrease 
will be short, while long securities whose prices are expected to appreciate. 
 
iv) Opportunistic 
The opportunistic fund managers continuously try to take advantage of current market conditions and 
opportunities by use of different strategies. 
 
2.4.9 Managed Futures (Commodity Trading Advisors or CAT) 
 
Fund managers in pursue of this strategy mainly invest in listed bonds, equity, commodity futures and 
currency markets. CTA’s are usually systematic traders or discretionary traders. Systematic traders rely 
on historic price data and market trends to predict future price movements. Hence, they heavily depend 
on computer-generated trading signals. On the other hand, the discretionary traders base their decision on 
fundamental and technical market analysis, the experience and trading skills they gained over the years. 
However, managed futures funds managers employ substantial amounts of leverage since they invest in 
future contracts. 
 
 
2.4.10 Multi-strategy 
 
Multi-strategy funds invest among several hedge fund strategies to profit from perceived opportunities 
and to diversify their portfolio. The combination of hedge funds seek to minimize potential effect of poor 
performance and deliver a more consistent long term investment return (as traditional diversified 
portfolios) than any of the individual fund. 
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However, this idea has given rise to funds of hedge funds (funds of funds) that allows investors to 
allocate their capital to different managers and gain diversification through a single investment. A style 
specific fund of funds manager is a fund of fund manager that allocates capital within a single strategy. 
While a multi-strategy fund of funds manager allocates capital to a variety of managers in multiple 
strategies. 
The performance of funds of funds will not be evaluated in this work since Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge 
fund index does not include funds of funds. 
 
 
Sector Weights 
 
 
Figure 2.4 the current sector weights of Tremont/Suisse hedge funds benchmark broad index 
 
 
 
2.5 Benefits of hedge funds 
 
Investors invest in hedge funds for two main reasons. Firstly, historically, hedge funds have higher risk-
adjusted and absolute returns than benchmarks. Also, hedge funds have historically outperformed on a 
long-term basis and shown ability to limit loss in down markets. 
Secondly, hedge funds provide diversification benefits to investors’ portfolios. This is because 
hedge funds historically exhibit low correlation with the general stock and bond markets, and their 
managers use risk management techniques that are generally uncommon within a traditional investment 
portfolio. However, some researchers such as Lhabitant and Learned (2002) argued that diversifying a 
portfolio by adding hedge funds is not a “free lunch” because hedge funds reduce positive skewness and 
21 
 
increase kurtosis of the portfolio. Hence, diversifying portfolios using hedge funds is a trade-off between 
profit potential and reduced probability of loss. 
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CHAPTER THREE: TRADITIONAL PROTFOLIO THEORY 
 
 
3.1 Correlation 
 
In statistics and probability theory, the correlation (correlation coefficient) between two random variables 
represents the degree and direction of their linear relationship. Among the numerous correlation 
coefficients, Pearson product-moment and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are the most 
commonly used methods of estimating the correlation between two random variables. Unlike the 
Spearman’s rho, the Pearson’s coefficient is less accurate when the distributions are non-normally 
distributed. Hence, the Spearman’s rank correlation will be used because it is more accurate regardless of 
the variable frequency distribution. It is defined as: 
 
                                                                                                      (3.1) 
     
 
Where di is the ith squared difference between the corresponding rankings, n is the number of values in 
each data set. The correlation coefficient lies between the interval of -1 and 1. If the Spearman’s rho is 1 
(-1), the rankings have perfectly linear relationship in the same direction (reverse direction). Also, with 
positive (negative) rho, shows increasing (decreasing) agreement between the rankings. While a rho of 
zero implies independent or no linear relationship between rankings. 
 
 
3.2 The centralized distribution moments 
 
The centralized distribution moments are the distributional less the distribution mean, µ. The nth moment 
about the mean of the stochastic variable, X is given by E(X −µ)n. where  E is the expectation operator. 
We will use the first four moments due to return distribution in hedge funds, as will be discussed later. 
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3.2.1 Expectation / Mean 
 
Expectation or mean, E(X) is the first moment of a distribution; 
 
                                                                                              (3.2) 
 
Where Pt is the probability distribution of the random variable, and Xt is the random variable. 
 
The centralized first moment equals zero. Hence, they are hardly used. 
 
3.2.2 Variance 
 
It is the second centralized distributional moment. Variance is the measure of statistical dispersion from 
the expected return (mean return). Hence, it is a measure of risk. It is given by 
 
                                                                               (3.3) 
 
The squared root of the variance (σ2) called standard deviation (σ)is also used as a measure of risk 
(dispersion). 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Skewness 
 
The third centralized moment is skewness, and it is a measure of symmetry of a distribution. The normal 
distribution (symmetric distribution) has a skewness of zero. 
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Skewness  = µ3  /σ3    
 
Where σ is the standard deviation, and µ3 is the third moment about the mean, given by 
 
                                                                      (3.4) 
         
With a skewness greater than zero (positive skewness), the standard deviation overestimates risk. While 
with a negative skewness (skewness less than zero), the standard deviation underestimates risk. 
 
3.2.4 Kurtosis 
 
Kurtosis is the fourth central moment that measures how tall and skinny or short and squart a distribution 
is, in relation to the normal distribution of the same variance. It is defined as: 
 
Kurtosis =   (µ4  /σ4) 
 
Where µ4 is the fourth moment about the mean, given by: 
 
 
Excess Kurtosis =   (µ4  /σ4) – 3                                                                                                     (3.5) 
 
 
The excess kurtosis of a normal distribution is zero. A distribution with excess kurtosis above zero will 
have fatter tail than would be observed in the normal distribution. Conversely, an excess kurtosis than 
zero, then the distribution has skinny tail than does the normal distribution. 
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3.3 The Mean-Variance framework 
 
When allocating investment funds between risk-free assets and risky portfolio, investors seek knowledge 
of risk-reward relationship of the assets. This is explained by the mean-variance framework (analysis). 
The analysis assumes the investors are generally risk averse. That is, investors prefer portfolio with 
higher expected return and lower variance. 
According to the framework, investors only care about their portfolio return means and variances. Hence, 
assuming normal distribution of their portfolio returns. The mean-variance analysis also assumes 
frictionless financial markets (free of transaction costs, purchase and sales taxes, tradable asset price and 
quantity restriction). 
However, investors differ in risk aversion. The quadratic utility function estimates investors’ risk-
reward preference given their levels of risk aversion. It is given by; 
 
U= E(r)-0.5 Aσ2 
 
Where U is utility value, A is an index of the investor’s risk aversion, r is the assets return, and σ2 is the 
variance. 
 
Harry Markowitz (1952) first introduced the mean-variance framework. His model of portfolio selection 
embodying diversification principles led to the efficient frontier of risky assets. The efficient frontier is 
the best possible portfolio given the constituent assets’ expected return and standard deviation. 
Given the expected returns, variance and covariance, we can plot the minimum-variance frontier (lowest 
possible variance against target portfolio expected return). The frontier has a convex shape, and whose 
degree of convexity depends on the correlation between the individual assets. 
The capital allocation line is drawn when a risk-free asset is added to the portfolio of risky assets. 
If this line connects the risk-free return with the tangency portfolio (portfolio with the highest sharpe 
ratio on the efficient frontier), it is designated the Capital Market Line (CML). The market portfolio is the 
tangency portfolio. The equation of the CML is represented as: 
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                                                                                           (3.6) 
 
Where Rf is the risk-free rate of return, E(Rm) the market portfolio expected return, and σm and σp are the 
standard deviation of market portfolio and portfolio, P, respectively. The diagram below shows the 
relationship between the efficient frontier and the capital market line. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Graph that shows the CML, the efficient frontier and the market portfolio 
 
3.4 Asset Pricing Model 
 
3.4.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by William Sharpe (1964), John Linter (1965) 
and Jan Mossin (1966). The CAPM is built on the Harry Markowitz (1959) model of portfolio choice 
(mean-variance-efficient portfolio). 
Sharpe (1964) and Linter (1965) add two key assumptions to Markowitz’s mean-variance-efficient 
portfolio model. They assume that investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns, and all 
investors borrow and lend at risk-free rate. Also, for his work, William Sharpe was awarded the Nobel 
prize in 1990. The CAPM predicts the expected return of an asset from the general market risk and risk-
free rate. It is given by: 
 
 
 
                                                                                               (3.7) 
 
βi   measures the sensitivity of Asset I on the market, and E(R) − Rf is the expected market premium 
(reward for taking risk above the risk-free rate). The Emperical Index Model of equation (3.7) is the ex-
post counterpart to CAPM. An ordinary least square (OLS) regression of Ri – Rf   on Rm − Rf  , estimates 
βi, and αi and εI should be statistically equal to zero in an efficient market (if αi = 0, the asset is fairly 
priced). 
 
 
                                                                                       (3.8) 
 
 
The CAPM is attractive due to its simplicity, intuitive prediction of relation between expected return and 
risk. Unfortunately, the CAPM has received criticism by many researches for its empirical problems. For 
instance, the CAPM uses the systematic risk in the market rather the risk (standard deviation) to price a 
financial asset. Hence, leaving out the effect of assets’ specific risk on the price of financial of those 
assets. 
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3.5 Absolute Performance Measurements 
 
Evaluating performance base on average return is not enough, since different investments (or assets) 
exhibit different risk exposure. Hence, many researchers have developed risk-adjusted performance 
measures, which estimate managers’ or funds’ performance. In this thesis, three traditional and four 
modern performance measures will be presented, since hedge funds do not often have benchmarks. 
The traditional performance measures assume normality of return distribution (but hedge funds returns 
are non-normally distributed). Consequently, the modern performance measures were developed to 
accommodate the non-normality of hedge fund returns. In the following, let Ri denote the mean return of 
asset i over the sample period, and Rf and Rm be the mean of the risk-free asset and market portfolio, 
respectively. 
 
 
3.5.1 Traditional Measurements 
 
3.5.1.1 Jensen Alpha 
 
The Jesen Alpha is a performance evaluation measurement named after Michael C. Jensen (1968).The 
CAPM predicts that the alpha (αi) for every asset should be zero (if assets are fairly priced). The Jensen 
alpha, αi, is the average realized return of the assets above (below) that predicted by the CAPM. Investors 
tend to prefer (buy) securities with superior (positive alpha) over securities with negative alpha. It is 
defined as: 
 
 
                                                                                                                          (3.9) 
 
 
Where E(Ri) is the expected return predicted by CAPM and Ri is the realized average return. Estimating 
the Jensen Alpha ex-post, we use OLS regression of equation (3.10) below; 
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                                                                                      (3.10) 
 
 
The statistical significance of Jensen Alpha can be verified using the standard student t-statistic (adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the error term) 
 
 
3.5.1.2 The Sharpe Ratio 
 
The Sharpe Ratio (reward-to-volatility ratio) is a commonly used risk-adjusted performance measure. It 
is defined as the average excess return per unit standard deviation of the return over the sampling period. 
The sharpe ratio best suited for undiversified investors since it uses standard deviation as total volatility.  
It is formulated as: 
 
 
                                                                                                                    (3.11) 
 
 
Where σi is the standard deviation. However, the sharpe ratio is based on the mean-variance theory and is 
valid for normally distributed returns. Hence, it cannot be applied to hedge funds (whose returns are non-
normally distributed) because standard deviation is not an adequate measure of risk associated with 
hedge fund. 
 
3.5.1.3 The Treynor Ratio 
 
The Treynor Ration (TR) is named after Jack L. Treynor (1965). The Treynor Ratio is defined as the 
excess return per unit systematic risk, βi, instead of total risk, σi, as in Sharpe Ratio. The Treynor ratio is 
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best suited for well diversified investors. Also, same as the sharpe ratio, the treynor ratio does not 
quantify the value added, rather better (worse) performance with higher (lower) ratio. TR is defined as: 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 (3.12) 
 
 
 
3.5.1.4 Theoretical problems 
 
Traditional indicators best suite returns that follow a normal (symmetrical) distribution. The standard 
deviation of these returns represents the risk. Conversely, hedge funds returns series are non-normally 
distributed and show strong autocorrelations. Hence, traditional performance measures suffer from 
theoretical problem when applied to hedge funds. 
 
3.5.1.4.1 Non-normality of Hedged Funds Return Distribution 
 
As mentioned above in (3.2.3) and (3.2.4), skew and kurtosis (or excess kurtoses) are used to determine 
the normality of a distribution. The skew coefficient measures the asymmetry coefficient of a 
distribution, while kurtosis coefficient measures the tail depth of the return distribution. 
 
Test of normality 
 
The Jarque-Bera test will be used to determine the normality of the return distribution. The Jarque-Bera 
statistisis defined by: 
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(3.13) 
 
Where n is the number of observations in the sample period. The Jarque-Bear statistic has a chi-squares 
distribution (with two degrees of freedom) under the null hypothesis of normality. The null hypothesis is 
a joint hypothesis of skew equal zero and excess kurtosis being zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5.1.4.2 Presence of Autocorrelation in Hedge Funds Return Series 
 
Lo (2002) documents that the Sharpe ratio is overstated in the case of positive autocorrelation of hedge 
funds returns. Also, Getmansky and Mackinlay (2004) show that hedge funds strong serial correlation 
(autocorrelation) can be attributed to the combination of illiquidity and “performance smoothing”.  In so 
doing, ranking hedge funds based on Sharpe ratio should take consideration of autocorrelation of their 
returns. 
 
 
 
 
Test for Autocorrelation 
 
The Ljung-Box (1978) test is a well-known autocorrelation (serial correlation) test. Its statistic is given 
by: 
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                                                                                                              (3.14) 
 
 
Where n is the sample size,  is the sample autocorrelation at lag j, and h is the number of lags being 
tested. The Ljung-Box statistic has a chi-squared distribution, with null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
For significance level α and h, the number of lags hypothesis of no autocorrelation (randomness) is 
rejected if 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, hedge funds with high (significant) positive or negative autocorrelation coefficient will reflect 
high Q-statistic. 
 
 
3.6 Innovative Absolute Performance measurement  
 
3.6.1 The Sortino 
 
Sortino and Price (1994) developed the Sortino ratio. It is a performance measurement which accounts 
for the asymmetry of hedge funds distribution. 
Unlike the Sharpe ratio, Sortino replaces standard deviation (σi) with downside deviation. Consiquentlt, 
the sortino ratio is more appropriate when the distribution is left-skewed (often the case for hedge funds 
returns). It is formulated as: 
 
 
 
 (3.15) 
33 
 
 
 
Where MAR (Minimum Acceptable Return) for hedge funds often is set to either zero or to the risk-free 
rate. Ri is the average return of the asset, T is the number of sub-periods, and DDi is the downside 
deviation given by: 
 
 
 
 
 
The downside deviation differs from the standard deviation by considering only those returns in the series 
that fall below the MAR (threshold). 
The shortcoming of the Sortino ratio is that it does not solve the problem of excess kurtosis and 
autocorrelation. 
 
3.6.2 Upside Potential Ratio (UPR) 
 
Sortino, Van Der Meer and Plantinga (1999) proposed the UPR which is the probability-weighted 
average of returns above the reference rate. In other words, the ratio of potential for success to the risk of 
failure (down side risk as calculated in sortino ratio). It is represented as; 
 
 
                                                              (3.16) 
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Where T is the number of period in the sample, Rt is the return of an investment in period t, ι+ = 1 if Rt 
>MAR, else ι+=0, and ι− = 1 if Rt =<MAR, else ι− =0. 
Unlike the sortino ratio, the UPR uses a consistent reference rate to evaluate both profit and losses. 
 
3.6.3 Autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio 
 
Lo (2002) propose an autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio in order to avoid overestimation of the 
Sharpe ratio of hedge fund returns. The ratio is defined as: 
 
                                            (3.17) 
 
 
 
Where SRi is the regular Sharpe ratio on a monthly basis, Pk is the kth autocorrelation for hedge fund 
returns, and the annualized autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio is given for q=12 (q is the number of 
months). 
 
3.6.4 Modified Sharpe Ratio 
 
The Autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio (in 3.6.3 above) proposed by Lo (2002) only takes 
autocorrelation of hedge funds into consideration. However, the modified Sharpe ratio captures the non-
normality (significant skew and excess kurtosis) of hedge fund returns. The modified Sharpe ratio differs 
from the regular Sharpe ratio in that the modified value at risk take into consideration skewness, excess 
kurtosis (including mean and standard deviation) and captures the risk better than does the standard 
deviation (as with regular sharp ratio). 
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                                                                                       (3.18) 
 
 
Ri= return of the portfolio, Rf= risk-free rate, and MVaRi is modified value at risk, given by: 
 
                    
 
Where,  
µi = asset i’s drift term (often set to Ri), 
z = the critical value for probability (1 – α) with a standard normal distribution (-1.96 for 95%), 
Si = the skewness of asset i, 
Ki = the excess kurtosis of asset i, and 
σi  = asset i’s standard deviation. 
 
3.6.5 The Omega 
 
The Omega is a measure introduced by Keating and Shadwick (2002) which incorporates all the 
moments of the return distribution. It requires no parametric assumption on the return distribution or on 
the utility function of the investor. Hence, ranking is always possible at any threshold level. Omega is 
expressed as the ratio between the gain and loss with respect to the threshold, L. in continuous time, it is 
given by: 
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                                                                                                   (3.19) 
 
 
 
Where L is the required return threshold, a and b are return intervals and F(x) is the cumulative 
distribution of return below threshold, L. 
 
Gupta, Kazemi, and Schneewies (2003) intituively expressed the Omega as: 
 
 
 
 
Where C(L) and P(L) are essentially the European call option and put option written on the investment, 
respectively. 
Moreover, Omega formula in a discrete time was provided by De Souza and Gokcan (2004); 
 
 
 
 
Where R+ (R-) is the return above (below) a threshold, L. hence, at a given threshold, L, a higher Omega 
is preferred. 
 
37 
 
3.6.6 The Kappa 
 
Kaplan and Knowles (2004) introduced the Kappa as a generalized downside risk-adjusted performance 
measure. “Generalized” is associated to Kappa because it can become any risk-adjusted return measure, 
through a single parameter, n. Kappa in expressed as: 
 
 
                                                                                                (3.20) 
 
 
Where Ri is the expected periodic return, τ is the investor’s minimum acceptable or threshold periodic 
return and LPM is the lower partial moment. The Sortino ratio equal to k2 and Omega equal k1+1. n is 
strictly greater than zero and n=3 is used to calculate the kappa in this thesis. 
Kappa can be calculated using discrete return data (or parametric based calculation), and by 
deriving a continuous return distribution from the values of the first four moments. The nth lower partial 
moment of continuous and discrete time, respectively. And are defined as: 
 
 
                                                                                       (3.21) 
 
                                                                            (3.22) 
3.7 Market timing 
 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) first proposed the model to assess the timing ability. The model adds a 
squared term (market premium) to the usual linear index model (SCL). It is given by: 
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rp – rf = αp + βp [rm –rf] + γp[rm – rf]2+ εp                                                                                                                                         (3.23) 
 
 
Where rp is portfolio return,
 
εp is the residual. There is evidence of market timing if γp is greater than 
zero (positive), because the characteristic line will be steeper. 
Also, Henriksson and Merton (1981) proposed a similar model to Treynor and Mazuy market timing 
model, but for the introduction of a dummy variable in the second market premium term as given by: 
 
 
rp – rf = αp + βp [rm –rf] + γp[rm – rf]D + εp                                                                                         (3.24) 
 
 
Where D is a dummy variable that equals 1 for rm >rf and zero otherwise. So, the second term becomes 
relevant when market return is greater than risk free rate. Similarly, a manager’s market timing ability is 
perceived when γp is positive. Hence, the portfolio beta equals βp in bear market (rm <rf) and   βp + γp is 
bull market (rm >rf) 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
4.1 Data Used In This Thesis 
 
In this thesis, I use hedge funds monthly returns data net of fees from Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge 
Fund Index (Benchmark Broad Index) from January 1994 to November 2008. The Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index is the leading Asset-weighted index and consists of primary 
subcategories (strategies) based on the investment styles of their constituent funds (strategies and sub 
strategies are defined in chapter two). The index which began in January 1994, is compiled by Credit 
Suisse Tremont Index LLC and tracks more than 900 funds with $50 million Asset Under Management 
(AUM), at least one-year track record and recent audited financial report. 
Moreover, data is also collected from equity, commodity and bonds indices for comparison with 
hedge funds returns. They include: 
- The equity indices considered are S&P500, NASDAQ composite and MSCI world indices.  
- The Philadelphia Gold and silver, and Dow Jones-AIG commodity indices represent the 
commodity market. 
- And the bond indices used are 30-year US Treasury Bills and Dow Jones Corporate Bond 
index (total). 
 
The 3-month US Treasury bill represents the risk-free rate. Moreover, S&P500 Index is the proxy for 
market performance index (benchmark). It consists of a collection of 500 large-cap common stocks 
actively traded in the United States, for which almost all the stocks are among the 500 American largest 
market capitalization stocks. 
 
4.2 Possible Biases In Hedge Funds Data 
 
Several biases may exist in hedge fund databases (indices). This is more likely to occur because of the 
way each database is constructed and some hedge funds managers tend to manipulate their data to make 
them attractive to potential investors. Therefore, such biases (errors) should be corrected to allow credible 
results and conclusions of the researcher. Some significant biases and their possible corrections will be 
addressed below; 
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i) Survivorship bias 
 
Survivorship bias can be defined as the performance difference between surviving and dissolve funds, or 
as performance difference between existing and all funds. It occurs when databases only reflect 
information on “existing funds”. The “non-existing” may be liquidated funds or existing funds (defunct 
funds) that no longer report their results to the databases. But some existing funds stop reporting because 
they do not want to attract new investment. Therefore, bad funds that fail generate an upward bias on 
returns, while good funds that close (or stop reporting) exert a downward bias. 
According to Amin and Kat (2003), survivorship bias also generate upward bias in the skewness, 
downward bias in the kurtosis, and downward bias on the standard deviation. However, Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index minimizes the effect of survivorship bias by not removing funds in 
their liquidation process in order to capture all of the potential performance before the funds stop 
reporting. 
 
ii)  Backfill bias 
 
Backfill bias (instant history bias) occurs when funds that are joining a database are allowed to backfill 
their earlier good returns, while their bad performance records are not backfill. 
Malkiel and Saha (2005) show that bacfillied returns significantly biases hedge funds returns upward. 
Also, to estimate and test for backfill bias in TASS database, they test the difference between the means 
(using t-statistic) and medians (using chi-squared statistic) of “backfilled” and “not backfilled” hedge 
funds returns. 
 
Conversely, for a new fund to be listed in the Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index, it must provide its 
historical performance record since inception. This prevents backfilling bias. 
 
iii)  Selection bias 
 
On like regular mutual funds, privately organized hedge funds are not required to publish their 
performance data to the public. So, hedge funds managers decide what information, when and to which 
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database to report. This may result in self selection bias because the characteristics and performance of 
the different databases do not represent the whole hedge fund universe. This is also the case when only 
funds with good results tend to join a database (upward bias), and high-performance managers no longer 
report their performance, probably because they have attained optimum size (downward bias). Fung and 
Hsieh (2000) estimate that these two opposite effects may result in negligible bias. 
 
iv) Infrequent pricing and illiquidity bias 
 
The natural tendency for hedge fund managers to “manage” optimally their monthly net asset value in 
order to smooth their returns posses a serious problem to hedge fund data. According to Lhabitant (2006), 
this problem is incident to hedge funds holding illiquid securities or securities that are difficult to price 
(such as small cap stocks, emerging market bonds, over-the –counter securities and distress assets), and 
most U.S onshore limited partnerships value their own portfolio. This consequently results in illiquidity 
bias because managers tend to smooth their returns (and systematically underestimate their portfolio 
volatility and their correlations with traditional indices) to look very attractive. 
Hedge funds managers must also provide their respective audited financial statements to Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Index in order to remain listed or to join the index. This minimizes the ability of the listed 
hedge fund managers to optimally “manage” their net asset value (or smooth their returns) 
 
v) Database/Sample selection bias 
 
Choosing a database or sample of hedge funds to evaluate is likely another major source of performance 
bias. Every existing fund database does not represent the entire fund universe. This is because most of the 
databases (including Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index) have specific criteria that eligible members 
must meet (such as minimum asset under management, audited financial statement, minimum years of 
existence). Also, several data vendors exclude particular hedge fund styles, for example Suisse/Tremont 
Hedge Fund Index excludes funds of hedge funds. These result in selection bias because hedge funds 
managers that do not meet these criteria and or particular hedge fund styles are excluded from the 
databases. 
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Moreover, other incidence of select Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund Index ion biases occur when managers 
report to one or two databases, but rarely to all. Hence, giving rise to various databases with different 
data collection methods. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
5.1.1 Previous Studies 
 
Kat and Lu (2002) studied the statistical behavior of individual hedge funds returns. They used monthly 
net of fee and portfolio of hedge funds returns of 376 individual hedge funds and 103 funds of hedge 
from June 1994- May 2001 (from Tremont TASS). To investigate the statistical behavior of hedge funds 
returns, they classified all the individual funds into various strategy groups, and also derived equally 
weighted portfolio returns of all funds in each strategy group. Firstly, they showed that on average the 
individual funds within various styles exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis (excess kurtosis). Also, 
individual hedge funds’ return distributions are negatively skewed, with global macro and long/short 
equity being exceptions. And found that different styles exhibit contrasting return behavior. Secondly, the 
portfolio of hedge funds has lesser standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis than do the average 
individual funds (exception of merger arbitrage and distress securities funds). 
Agarwal and Naik (2000) evaluate the performance of hedge funds by formulating passive option-
based strategies and buy-and-hold strategies as benchmark. They were searching for adequate benchmark 
which can be used to evaluate the performance of managed portfolios, especially hedge funds whose risks 
are non-linearly exposed to standard asset markets. They used 586 funds from the Hedge Funds Research 
(HFR) database from January 1990 to October 1998, and found out that but for short and macro, all the 
hedge fund strategies are negatively skewed. Also, they found that hedge fund returns have significant 
kurtosis. However, they obtained the summary statistics of some equity, bonds and commodity indices. 
They showed that these indices returns were closer to normality (but for Lehman High Yield Index and 
the Momentum Factor) than do the individual hedge funds. 
Brooks and Kat (2002) studied the statistical properties of monthly returns of  48 hedge fund 
indices constructed by HFR, Zurich Capital Market, CSFB/Tremont, Hennessee, VAN, Altvest, and 
TUNA from January 1995 to April 2001 obtain summary statistics for some equity and bonds indices for 
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comparison. The y found that most hedge fund index returns have higher mean and lower standard 
deviation than do stocks and bonds. This would have violated the law of market efficiency but for the fact 
that most of the hedge fund returns exhibit lower skewness and high kurtosis than do stocks and bonds. 
This means that the hedge funds are more likely to make negative returns. 
Other researchers such as Getmansky, Lo and Makarov (2004), and Saha (2004) reported that 
hedge funds exhibit negative skew and higher kurtosis than do traditional Assets. Malkiel and Saha 
(2005), and Valeri and Steen (2008) also support negative skewed and positive kurtosis of hedge funds 
returns. 
 
 
5.1.2 Summary statistics Credit Suisse/ Tremont Hedge Fund Index and the    indices for 
comparison 
 
As shown on table 5.1.2, the summary statistics of   Credit Suisse/ Tremont Hedge Fund Index 
monthly returns for the whole analysis period (January 1994-November 2008) is obtained. Also, 
descriptive statistics of MSCI World, Nasdaq Composite, S&P 500, Philadelphia Gold & Silver, Dow 
Jones-AIG commodity and Dow Jones corporate bond, and 30-years US Treasury bond indices. 
All the returns means are positive, but for 30 years US Treasury. Also, hedge funds generally have higher 
(significant) mean than the equity, bond and commodity indices considered. The highest hedge fund 
mean return is 1.03% (Global Macro) while the lowest is 0.06% (Dedicated short Bias). According to Lu 
and Mulvey (2001) hedge funds that exhibit positive skew tend to have lower returns because they are the 
more desirable funds. This is the case with dedicated short bias with highest positive skewness (0.77) but 
low insignificant returns (0.06%). 
Considering standard deviation, hedge funds returns generally exhibit lower standard deviation than do 
equity and commodity indices (but for bond market) employed. The hedge fund strategy with the highest 
standard deviation is dedicated short bias (4.91%) while risk arbitrage (1.25%) has the least. However, 
both Philadelphia Gold & Silver, and Nasdaq composite indices have distinctly higher standard deviation 
of 10.64% and 7.42%, respectively. Contrary to hedge fund returns low standard deviation, Brooks and 
Kat (2001) found that autocorrelation of hedge fund returns underestimates the standard deviation of 
hedge funds returns. 
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Taking skewness and kurtosis into account, the results are similar to previous studies. Most of the 
hedge fund strategies are negatively skewed, but for dedicated short bias (0.77), long/short equity (0.02) 
and managed future (0.00). Equity market netural (-11.99) and fixed income arbitrate (-4.65) are the most 
negatively skewed strategies.   Also, all the hedge fund strategies, including the equity, bonds and 
commodity indices exhibit positive kurtosis. Amongst, the hedge fund strategies, equity market neutral 
(154.61), fixed income arbitrage (30.00) and convertible arbitrage (19.65) have the highest kurtosis while 
managed future (0.11) and dedicated short bias (1.70) are the least. In general, hedge funds have higher 
kurtosis and more negatively skewness than do equity, bonds and commodity indices (traditional Assets), 
Agarwal and Naik (2004) supports this. 
Considering autocorrelation, hedge funds generally show higher and significant positive first and second 
order autocorrelation coefficient than do the equity, bond and commodity indices. In exception of  
dedicated short bias, equity market neutral, hedge funds at least show significant first (AR(1))  and 
second (AR(2))  order autocorrelation coefficients, most of which are positive. Within hedge funds, 
convertible arbitrage (0.569) and fixed income arbitrage (0.5) have the highest first order autocorrelation, 
as opposed to managed future (0.068) equity market neutral (0.082) having the lowest first order 
autocorrelation coefficients. Also, the commodity indices at least exhibit significant first and second 
order autocorrelation (mostly negative coefficients). Whereas the equity and bond indices do not exhibit 
first or second order autocorrelation, but for MSCI world and DJ- corporate bond indices. 
Moreover, as indicated by their highly significant Jarque-Bera statistics, hedge funds are non-
normally distributed, excluding managed futures. The equity, commodity and bond indices also have 
lower significant Jarque-Bera statistics than do hedge funds. 
On average, hedge funds indices have higher Sharpe ratios than do the equity, commodity and bond 
indices considered. But as supported by Amin and Kat (2001), the Sharpe is not an appropriate 
performance measure for hedge funds because Sharpe ratio does not consider the non-normality of hedge 
fund returns distribution. 
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Table 5.1.2 Descriptive statistics of Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index, equity, bond and commodity 
indices from 01/1994 to 11/2008 
 Mean Min Max St.Dev Excess 
Kurto
sis 
Skewne
ss 
Mean 
excess 
return 
AR(1) AR(2) Jarque-Bera Sharpe 
ratio 
Hedge Fund 
Index 
0.73* -7.55 8.53 2.30 2.33 -0.18 0.60 0.214* 0.105* 41.61* 0.26 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
0.47* -12.59 3.57 1.98 19.65 -3.58 0.34 0.569* 0.267* 3262.27* 0.17 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
0.06 -8.69 22.71 4.91 1.70 0.77 -0.07 0.094 -0.081 39.24* -0.01 
Emerging 
Markets 
0.65 -23.03 16.42 4.59 4.60 -0.73 0.52 0.316* 0.053* 173.73* 0.11 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.52 -40.45 3.26 3.19 154.61 -11.99 0.39 0.082 0.062 182587.71* 0.12 
Event Driven 0.79* -11.77 3.68 1.76 15.02 -2.73 0.66 0.3768 0.214* 1905.87 0.38 
Distressed 0.88* -12.45 4.10 1.94 12.87 -2.45 0.75 0.377* 0.214* 1414.38* 0.39 
Even Driven 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.76* -11.52 4.66 1.88 10.72 -2.08 0.62 0.328* 0.203* 986.06* 0.33 
Risk 
Arbitrage 
0.57* -6.15 3.81 1.25 5.07 -1.08 0.44 0.313* 0.004* 226.38* 0.35 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
0.31* -14.04 2.07 1.73 30.00 -4.65 0.17 0.5* 0.122* 7356.32* 0.10 
Global Macro 1.03* -11.55 10.60 3.06 3.01 -0.03 0.90 0.097 0.037 67.62* 0.29 
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.82* -11.43 13.01 2.96 3.50 0.02 0.69 0.221* 0.097* 91.26* 0.23 
Managed 
Futures 
0.63* -9.35 9.95 3.45 0.11 0.00000
02 
0.50 0.068 -0.176* 0.10 0.14 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.60* -7.35 3.61 1.57 6.80 -1.99 0.47 0.33* 0.229* 454.90* 0.30 
Equity 
indices 
           
msci world 0.32 -19.05 8.91 4.23 2.48 -1.05 0.18 0.162* 0.022 78.82* 0.04 
Nasdaq 
composit 
0.66 -22.90 21.98 7.42 0.98 -0.37 0.53 0.095 -0.006 11.14* 0.07 
S&P500 0.45 -16.83 9.67 4.33 1.43 -0.80 0.32 0.105 -0.009 34.38* 0.07 
Commodity 
indices 
           
Philadelphia 
Gold&Silver 
0.52 -38.22 53.39 10.64 3.30 0.44 0.39 -0.128* -0.178* 87.02* 0.04 
Dow Jones-
AIG 
0.28 -21.59 10.12 4.54 2.50 -0.84 0.15 0.159* -0.044* 67.77* 0.03 
Bond indices            
30yrs US 
treasury bond 
-0.28 -25.00 15.87 4.42 5.45 -0.53 -0.41 0.013 -0.133 230.26* -0.09 
Dow Jones 
corporate 
bond 
0.49* -6.22 6.25 1.66 2.85 -0.34 0.35 0.026 -0.21* 51.00* 0.21 
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Significant coefficients at 10% degree of freedom are in bold and * at 5% significance level. St.Dev is the respective 
standard deviation, AR (1) and AR (2) are first and second order autocorrelation coefficients. Min and Max represent 
minimum and maximum returns, respectively. 
 
 
 
5.2 Correlation 
 
In this sub chapter, the Pearson correlation between the returns of hedge fund strategies and with the 
indices for comparison (equity, bond and commodity indices) will be verified for the whole period 
(January 1994- November 2008) and during financial crises.  
 
 
5.2.1 Previous Studies 
 
Brooks and Kat (2001) report that most of the hedge fund index returns exhibit high correlation with the 
equity indices, but low and typically negative correlation with the bond market. They also found that 
most unsmoothed hedge fund return exhibit higher correlation with both stock and bond indices than do 
those of the original return series. 
Kat and Lu (2002) found that individual hedge fund returns exhibit moderately low positive 
correlation with equity market, close to zero correlation with bonds which varies inversely with the 
correlation with stocks. They formed equally weighted portfolios of individual hedge funds which exhibit 
significantly higher correlation with both equity and bond indices than do the correlation between 
individual hedge funds and traditional Assets (equity and bond). They also demonstrate that most 
individual hedge funds have low correlation with funds in the same and different strategy group. 
Onlike Kat and Lu (2002), Fung and Hseih (2001) report that individual hedge funds are loosely 
correlated to standard Asset classes, while the hedge fund indices exhibit strong positive correlation with 
most of the standard Asset. Schneeweis and Spurgin (1998), Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbolson (1999) 
also support that individual hedge funds are loosely correlated to standard asset indices. 
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5.2.2 Correlation between hedge fund strategies 
 
Unlike Kat and Lu (2002), hedge funds generally exhibit moderate correlation (averagely 0.27) between 
different strategies. Also, as opposed to Kat and Lu (2002) the correlation of hedge funds within a 
strategy (event driven strategy) is high. The highest correlation within a strategy is between event driven 
and event driven-multi strategy (0.95) followed by event driven and distress (0.94), while the least 
between distress and risk arbitrage (0.59).Also, dedicated short bias exhibit negative moderate correlation 
(-0.34 on average) with other hedge fund strategies, but for managed future (0.003).  Managed futures 
shows the very low (mostly negative) correlation series with other hedge fund strategies, while, event 
driven, distress and event driven-multi strategy exhibit higher correlation series with other funds 
strategies. However, the highest inter strategy correlation is between convertible arbitrage and fixed 
income arbitrage (0.78), and long/short equity and event driven (0.72).  
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Table 5.2.2 Rank Correlation between individual credit Suisse/hedge funds index strategies for whole 
period (January 1994 to November 2008) and during financial crises 
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 Dedicated   
Short Bias 
-0.23 
-0.19 
           
Emerging 
Markets 
0.42 
0.51 
-0.53 
-0.65 
          
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.21 
0.19 
-0.12 
-0.13 
0.12 
0.12 
         
 Event Driven 0.66 
0.69 
-0.57 
-0.57 
0.70 
0.81 
0.28 
0.29 
        
Distressed 0.60 
0.64 
-0.57 
-0.60 
0.63 
0.76 
0.33 
0.37 
0.94 
0.97 
       
Multi-
Strategy 
0.65 
0.69 
-0.50 
-0.52 
0.70 
0.82 
0.22 
0.23 
0.95 
0.98 
0.79 
0.89 
      
 Risk 
Arbitrage 
0.49 
0.54 
 
-0.46 
-0.43 
0.49 
0.72 
0.14 
0.15 
0.69 
0.80 
0.59 
0.73 
0.66 
0.80 
     
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
0.78 
0.88 
-0.17 
-0.16 
0.39 
0.45 
0.33 
0.33 
0.54 
0.57 
0.50 
0.54 
0.52 
0.57 
0.31 
0.39 
    
Global Macro 0.37 
0.45 
-0.12 
0.01 
0.46 
0.44 
0.07 
0.02 
0.42 
0.45 
0.36 
0.37 
0.46 
0.50 
0.22 
0.35 
0.42 
0.50 
   
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.44 
0.44 
-0.68 
-0.67 
0.64 
0.70 
0.17 0.72 
0.75 
0.64 
0.72 
0.70 
0.72 
0.57 
0.61 
0.37 
0.40 
0.47 
0.43 
  
Managed 
Futures 
-0.08 
-0.26 
0.10 
0.32 
-0.05 
-0.19 
-0.02 
-0.07 
-0.08 
-0.30 
-0.08 
-0.28 
-0.09 
-0.31 
-0.09 
-0.27 
-0.07 
-0.18 
0.27 
0.28 
0.04 
-0.06 
 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.67 
0.79 
-0.16 
-0.06 
0.23 
0.25 
0.34 
0.38 
0.50 
0.47 
0.43 
0.46 
0.50 
0.45 
0.32 
0.33 
0.62 
0.78 
0.26 
0.39 
0.40 
0.40 
0.04 
-0.10 
 
            
Average 
correlation 
0.36 
0.45 
-0.34 
-0.30 
0.35 
0.40 
0.17 
0.17 
0.48 
0.49 
0.43 
0.46 
0.46 
0.49 
0.33 
0.39 
0.38 
0.42 
0.30 
0.35 
0.37 
0.38 
-0.01 
-0.12 
The figures in black and green are the correlation between the strategies for the whole period and during financial crises, 
respectively.  The bolded green figures represent correlation coefficients that increase during financial crises. The total 
average correlation between hedge fund strategies are 0.27 for whole period and 0.30 during financial crises. the 
correlation averages are obtained by including to the missed figures on the table (without their self correlation of 1). 
 
 
I also studied the correlation between hedge strategies during financial crises, and found some 
similarities and changes. 
Same as for the whole period, managed futures still exhibit low correlation (-0.01 on average) 
with other funds strategies, and dedicated short bias maintains moderate negative correlation with other 
strategies (averagely -0.34). 
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In general, the correlation between individual hedge funds is moderate, but the average 
correlation slightly increases from 0.27 in whole period to 0.30 during financial crises. This minimizes 
the diversification effect of a portfolio of hedge funds. Liang (2003) explained that higher correlation 
between hedge funds during financial crises is due to liquidity squeeze, since fund managers are 
compelled to invest in limited securities and follow similar strategies.  
 
 
5.2.3 Correlation of hedge funds with stock, bond and commodity indices 
 
5.2.3.1 Whole period (January 1994 – November 2008) 
 
As shown on table 5.2.3.2 below, hedge funds exhibit low correlation with commodity, bonds and equity 
indices, but for MSCI world. Long/short equity (0.68), event driven (0.67), and distress (0.65) have the 
highest correlation with MSCI world index, whereas dedicated short bias shows negative correlation with 
the other indices (but for S&P500 and Philadelphia gold and silver). On average, hedge funds are more 
loosely correlated to nasdaq composite (0.03) and S&P500 (0.06) indices, but moderately correlated to 
MSCI Worldindex (0.36). 
The Philadelphia gold and silver index also shows low and mostly negative correlation (averagely 
-0.09) with hedge funds, while Dow Jones –AIG commodity index is moderately correlated to hedge 
funds (0.27 on average).  
Although hedge funds are loosely correlated to the considered commodity indices as a whole, 
they show higher correlation with Dow Jones-AIG commodity index as opposed to very low and 
dominantly negative correlation with Philadelphia gold and silver index. They also show low and mostly 
positive correlation with the bond indices. 
 
5.2.3.2 During financial crises 
 
Table 5.2.3.2 presents the correlation between hedge funds and equity, bond, and commodity indices 
during five major global financial crises. They include; 
- Asian financial crises (July 1997 to June 1998) 
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- Russian debt crises/long-term capital management fiasco (August 1998 to June 1999) 
- Dot com bubble burst (March 2000 to March 2001) 
- 9/11 world trade center attacks (September 2001 to December 2001) 
- Current subprime market fallout (January 2008 to November 2008). The current subprime 
market fallout is only analyzed till November 2008, because November 2008 is the limit of 
analysis period in this thesis. 
 
As with the entire period, hedge funds generally show higher positive correlation with MSCI world than 
with nasdaq composite and S&P500 indices during. Long/short equity (0.76), event driven (0.71), 
emerging markets (0.70), and distress (0.70) exhibit the highest correlation with MSCI world index , 
while dedicated short bias shows the lowest (-0.73). Also, Philadelphia gold &silver index exhibit 
negative correlation with almost all the hedge fund strategies, as opposed to averagely increased 
correlation between Dow Jones-AIG commodities during financial crises (from 0.27 in whole period to 
0.33 during financial crises). 
 However, bonds correlations with hedge funds generally increase during financial crises 
(averagely from 0.12 to 0.17). This is due to increase hedge funds correlation with 30 years bonds and 
Dow Jones corporate bonds during financial crises. 
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Table 5.2.3.2 Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge funds index strategies Correlation with equity, bond and 
commodity indices for the whole period (Jan1994- Nov 2008) and during financial crises 
 msci 
world 
Nasdaq 
composite 
S&P500 Averag
e 
correlat
ion with 
equities 
Phlx 
Gold 
& 
Silver 
DJ-
AIG 
Averag
e 
correlat
ion with 
commo
dities 
30yrs 
US 
treasur
y bond 
DJ 
corporate 
bond 
Averag
e 
correlat
ion  
with 
bonds 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
0.41 0.08 0.16 0.22 -0.03 0.36 0.16 0.05 0.37 0.21 
0.50 0.06 0.20 0.25 -0.04 0.47 0.22 0.11 0.49 0.30 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
-0.71 -0.01 0.01 -0.24 0.17 -0.13 0.02 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 
-0.73 0.07 0.11 -0.18 0.40 -0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.10 -0.09 
Emerging 
Markets 
0.59 0.004 -0.03 0.190 -0.14 0.28 0.068 0.12 0.17 0.14 
0.70 -0.05 -0.07 0.195 -0.25 0.39 0.071 0.14 0.23 0.19 
Equity 
Market 
Neutral 
0.23 -0.0003 0.02 0.08 -0.16 0.23 0.04 0.41 -0.23 0.09 
0.26 -0.02 0.003 0.08 -0.24 0.28 0.02 0.65 -0.34 0.15 
Event 
Driven 
0.67 -0.003 0.04 0.24 -0.20 0.35 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.17 
0.71 -0.05 0.01 0.22 -0.35 0.38 0.02 0.27 0.20 0.23 
Distressed 0.65 0.03 0.07 0.25 -0.18 0.31 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.17 
0.70 -0.02 0.05 0.24 -0.39 0.37 -0.01 0.29 0.18 0.23 
Even 
Driven 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.61 -0.04 0.01 0.19 -0.20 0.34 0.07 0.16 0.15 0.15 
0.67 -0.08 -0.05 0.18 -0.31 0.36 0.03 0.24 0.19 0.21 
Risk 
Arbitrage 
0.54 0.07 0.19 0.27 -0.15 0.22 0.04 0.10 0.21 0.15 
0.64 0.03 0.16 0.28 -0.21 0.33 0.06 0.19 0.23 0.21 
Fixed 
Income 
Arbitrage 
0.38 0.04 0.08 0.17 -0.06 0.42 0.18 0.07 0.27 0.17 
0.46 0.08 0.13 0.22 -0.08 0.51 0.21 0.16 0.37 0.27 
Global 
Macro 
0.25 -0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.002 0.21 0.11 -0.16 0.26 0.05 
0.20 0.02 -0.10 0.04 -0.02 0.30 0.14 -0.17 0.38 0.11 
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.68 0.13 0.12 0.31 -0.17 0.31 0.07 0.05 0.22 0.13 
0.76 0.12 0.11 0.33 -0.26 0.39 0.06 0.07 0.35 0.21 
Managed 
Futures 
-0.09 -0.01 -0.09 -0.06 0.02 0.21 0.12 -0.16 0.12 -0.02 
-0.22 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.25 0.15 0.20 -0.38 0.19 -0.09 
Multi-
Strategy 
0.42 0.11 0.18 0.24 -0.08 0.38 0.15 0.14 0.27 0.21 
0.44 0.17 0.33 0.31 -0.01 0.46 0.22 0.12 0.44 0.28 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
Average 
0.36 0.03 0.06 0.15 -0.09 0.27 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.12 
0.39 0.04 0.07 0.17 -0.12 0.33 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.17 
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The figures in black and green represent pearson correlation of hedge funds returns for the whole period and during 
financial crises, respectively. Also, the correlation coefficient in red and blue are the total correction for the whole period 
and during fincial crises, respectively. 
 
In conclusion, the correlation between hedge funds of different strategies is moderate, but high 
between hedge funds within the event driven strategy. Also, the correlation between and within (the event 
driven strategy and sub strategy) hedge funds strategies slightly increases during financial crises. On the 
contrary, managed futures and dedicated short bias experience negative (lowest) correlation with the 
other hedge fund strategies for the whole period and during financial crises. Moreover, excluding MSCI 
world, hedge funds are loosely correlated to equity indices over the entire period and financial crises. 
Hedge funds generally exhibit low correlation with bonds, but exhibit fair correlation with Dow Jones 
corporate bonds (0.22) during financial crises.  
Finally, hedge funds are loosely (mostly negative) correlated to Philadelphia gold and silver, but 
moderately correlated to Dow Jones-AIG commodity. For the whole period and during financial crises, 
hedge funds show higher correlation with MSCI World (0.36, 0.39), Dow Jones –AIG (0.27, 0.33) and 
Dow Jones corporate bond (0.16, 0.22) than with the other indices for comparison. 
 
5.3 Performance Measurement of Hedge Funds in comparison to equity,      commodity and bond 
indices 
 
The performance of hedge funds in comparison to the equity, bond and commodity indices will be 
analyzed using performance measures such as the Sortino, upside potential, Omega, Kappa, Sharpe, 
modified Sharpe, and autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratios for the whole, non-financial crises and 
financial crises periods. 
Also, the effects of autocorrelation and distribution (kurtosis and skewness) of returns for the 
entire period will be observed, as represented by ∆ASR and ∆MSR on table 5.3.1, respectively. 
 
5.3.1 The entire period (Jan1994-Nov 2008) 
 
The monthly sharpe ratio of the Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index and its strategies ranges 
between 0.386 to -0.014, with distress and dedicated short bias funds being the highest and lowest, 
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respectively. The Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge funds generally have higher Sharpe ratios than do the 
equity, bond and commodity indices. 
Considering the Sortino ratio, the hedge funds’ Sortino ratios range from 0.779 (risk arbitrage) to 
0.020 (dedicated short bias) for minimum accepted return (MAR) equal zero and from 0.599 (risk 
arbitrage) to -0.023 (dedicated short bias) for MAR equals the risk free rate. But for the poor performance 
of the dedicated short bias, hedge funds have greater Sortino ratios than do the indices for comparison 
(Dow Jones corporate bond excluded). The equity and commodity indices have positive Sortino ratios, 
meanwhile 30 years US treasury bond index has negative Sortino ratios which are much smaller 
compared to Dow Jones corporate bond index. 
Moreover,  hedge funds together with equity, bond and commodity indices show positive upside 
potential ratios (UPR) both for MAR=0 and MAR=rf. That is, they performed greater than the MAR. 
However, equity market neutral, fixed market arbitrage and 30 years US treasury bonds have the least 
UPR compared to the other hedge fund strategies and indices for comparison (equity, bond and 
commodity indices). In exception of equity market, fixed income arbitrage and convertible arbitrage, 
hedge funds exhibit higher UPR than do equity, commodity and bond (excluding Dow Jones corporate 
bond) indices. 
 Dedicate short bias has the least Omega among the hedge funds. Also, leaving out dedicated 
short bias, hedge funds show higher Omega compared to equity, commodity and  Dow Jones corporate 
bond) indices. 
Only 30 years US Treasury bond index and dedicated short bias among others have negative 
kappa, for MAR equals zero and or MAR equals the risk free rate. This is because their respective mean 
returns are less than the threshold or MAR of zero or risk free rate. Also, without dedicated short bias and 
equity market neutral, hedge funds generally have higher kappa ratios that do the other indices, but for 
Dow Jones corporate bonds. 
Looking at the respective modified Sharpe ratios, once more only 30 years US Treasury bond 
index, and dedicated short bias and equity market neutral have higher modified Sharpe ratios (MSR). 
Also, but for dedicated short bias and equity market neutral, hedge funds generally exhibit greater MSR 
than do the equity, commodity and bond indices (but Dow Jones corporate bond). Although, hedge funds 
have generally dominated in terms of MSR, they suffer the most when the regular Sharpe ratios are 
adjusted for skewness and excess kurtosis. These reductions are represented as ∆MSR (Modifie Sharpe 
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Ratio minus Sharpe Ratio) on table 5.3.1 below. Conversely, dedicated short bias and 30 years US 
Treasury bonds’ MSR increased in reference to their respective regular Sharpe ratios. 
Hedge funds also generally dominate in terms of autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio (ASR) 
than do the equity, commodity and bond (but Dow Jones corporate bond) indices. Within hedge funds, 
dedicated short bias (-0.056) has the least ASR (annualized), whereas risk arbitrage (0.936) has the most.   
30 years US Treasury bonds also have negative ASR of -0.368. Onlike for MSR, most of the hedge funds 
and the other indices’ ASR are less than their respective regular annualized Sharpe ratios. The decrease is 
represented as ∆ASR (annualized autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratio less annualized Sharpe ratio) on 
table 5.3.1 below. Generally, hedge funds regular annualized Sharpe ratio are more negatively affected 
(that is lower ∆ASR) than the equity, commodity and bond indices. This is due higher positive 
autocorrelation in hedge funds returns, since they hold illiquid assets. Conversely, managed futures, 
Philadelphia gold & silver and Dow Jones corporate bond indices’ respective ASR are higher than their 
respective regular annualized Sharpe ratios. This is so because they averagely exhibit negative 
autocorrelation of returns. 
 
In summary, although hedge funds’ performances generally appear to dominate, dedicated short 
bias (in some cases equity market neutral) performed poorer than do the equity, commodity and bond 
indices. The 30 years US Treasury bonds averagely appear to have the worst performance, whereas Dow 
Jones corporate bonds outperformed many hedge fund strategies. Also, risk arbitrage, distress, event 
driven, and event driven-multi strategies have the best performance than do the other hedge fund 
strategies (and the hedge fund index). The hedge fund index also outperforms most of its constituent 
strategies, the equity, and bond and commodity indices.  
In reference to 5.3.1(b), about 54% of hedge funds strategies outperformed all the equity, bond 
and commodity indices considered. But if the Dow Jones corporate is excluded, approximately 92% of 
hedge fund strategies outperformed the equity, bond and commodity markets. 
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Table 5.3.1(a) Performance Ratios of Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, Equity, Bond and 
Commodity indices from January 1994 to November 2008 (whole period) 
 Sortino UPR Omega Kappa SR MSR √12SR ASR ASR MSR 
mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf 
Hedge Fund 
Index 
0.544    
6 
0.446    
6 
0.930   
4 
0.832    
4 
2.412    
8 
2.072    
8 
0.355  
4 
0.283  
5 
0.260  
7 
0.103    
4 
0.900 0.673  
7 
-0.228  
15 
-0.157  
14 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
0.293  
11 
0.211  
11 
0.583 
16 
0.510  
18 
2.014   
11 
1.686  
11 
0.162 
11 
0.116  
11 
0.172  
10 
0.051  
11 
0.595 0.324  
13 
-0.271  
16 
-0.121  
11 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
0.020  
20 
-0.023   
20 
0.624 
12 
0.589  
12 
1.033   
20 
0.964  
20 
0.016  
20 
-0.018  
20 
-
0.014  
20 
-0.009  
19 
-0.050 -0.056  
20 
-0.006  
4 
0.006    
2 
Emerging 
Markets 
0.204  
12 
0.163  
12 
0.639  
10 
0.602  
11 
1.470   
14 
1.361  
14 
0.131  
12 
0.103  
12 
0.113  
13 
0.042  
12 
0.391 0.376   
11 
-0.015 
5 
-0.071   
9 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
0.172  
14 
0.128  
13 
0.272  
21 
0.235  
21 
2.712    
6 
2.196    
7 
0.073  
16 
0.054  
16 
0.122  
12 
-0.047  
21 
0.423 0.359  
12 
-0.064  
11 
-0.169    
15 
Event Driven 0.646    
3 
0.539    
3 
0.915   
5 
0.811    
6 
3.399    
3 
2.840    
2 
0.348  
5 
0.286  
4 
0.376  
2 
0.103    
5 
1.302 0.863   
3 
-0.439  
20 
-0.273 
20 
Distressed 0.668    
2 
0.568    
2 
0.941   
3 
0.844    
3 
3.427    
2 
2.901    
1 
0.361  
3 
0.303  
3 
0.386  
1 
0.108    
3 
1.336 0.872  
2 
-0.464   
21 
-0.278  
21 
Event Driven 
Multi-Strategy 
0.595    
4 
0.491    
5 
0.885   
7 
0.784    
7 
3.054    
4 
2.562    
4 
0.331  
6 
0.268  
6 
0.332  
4 
0.096    
6 
1.151 0.788  
5 
-0.363  
18 
-0.236  
18 
Risk Arbitrage 0.779    
1 
0.599    
1 
1.094   
1 
0.909    
2 
3.473    
1 
2.680    
3 
0.449   
2 
0.335  
2 
0.353  
3 
0.113    
2 
1.222 0.936  
1 
-0.286  
17 
-0.239  
19 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
0.202  
13 
0.115  
14 
0.459  
19 
0.385  
20 
1.789  
12 
1.417  
13 
0.109  
13 
0.062  
15 
0.100  
14 
0.031  
14 
0.348 0.216  
14 
-0.132  
12 
-0.069  
8 
Global Macro 0.594    
5 
0.518    
4 
0.995   
2 
0.912    
1 
2.580    
7 
2.301    
5 
0.563   
1 
0.483  
1 
0.294  
6 
0.117    
1 
1.017 0.841  
4 
-0.176  
13 
-0.177  
16 
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.478    
9 
0.401    
8 
0.898   
6 
0.821    
5 
2.138    
10 
1.897    
9 
0.307  
9 
0.252  
7 
0.232  
8 
0.094    
7 
0.803 0.627  
10 
-0.177  
14 
-0.138  
13 
Managed 
Futures 
0.306  
10 
0.242  
10 
0.816   
10 
0.757    
9 
1.600  
13 
1.449  
12 
0.221 
10 
0.171  
10 
0.145  
11 
0.067  
10 
0.502 0.643  
8 
0.141  
1 
-0.078  
10 
Multi-Strategy 0.543    
7 
0.423    
7 
0.849   
9 
0.733  
10 
2.771    
5 
2.273    
6 
0.325  
7 
0.249  
8 
0.297  
5 
0.094    
8 
1.028 0.640  
9 
-0.388  
19 
-0.203  
17 
msci world 0.099  
17 
0.058  
17 
0.558 
17 
0.524  
17 
1.217  
17 
1.122  
17 
0.067  
17 
0.039  
18 
0.043  
17 
0.017  
17 
0.150 0.113  
18 
-0.037 
8 
-0.026   
5 
Nasdaq 
composite 
0.128  
16 
0.102  
15 
0.602 
15 
0.581  
14 
1.269  
16 
1.210   
16 
0.091 
15 
0.072  
13 
0.071  
16 
0.031  
13 
0.246 0.210  
15 
-0.036  
7 
-0.040   
6 
S&P500 0.143  
15 
0.101  
16 
0.613 
13 
0.576  
15 
1.352  
15 
1.251  
15 
0.099  
14 
0.069  
14 
0.073  
15 
0.030  
15 
0.252 0.195  
16 
-0.057  
10 
-0.043   
7 
Philadelphia  
Gold&Silver 
0.075  
19 
0.056  
18 
0.603 
14 
0.588  
13 
1.141  
19 
1.104  
18 
0.054  
19 
0.040  
17 
0.037  
18 
0.018  
16 
0.128 0.187  
17 
0.059   
2 
-0.018   
3 
Dow Jones -
AIG 
0.085  
18 
0.045  
19 
0.557  
18 
0.525  
16 
1.180  
18 
1.093  
19 
0.058  
18 
0.031  
19 
0.033  
19 
0.013  
18 
0.116 0.092  
19 
-0.023 
6 
-0.020   
4 
30yrs US 
treasury bond 
-0.085 
21 
-0.125  
21 
0.455 
20 
0.429  
19 
0.842  
21 
0.778  
21 
-0.055  
21 
-0.080  
21 
-
0.093 
21 
-0.037  
20 
-0.322 -0.368  
21 
-0.046 
9 
0.056    
1 
Dow Jones 
corporate 
bond 
0.490    
8 
0.364    
9 
0.884   
8 
0.770    
8 
2.247    
9 
1.832  
10 
0.311  
8 
0.226  
9 
0.212  
9 
0.082    
9 
0.736 0.757  
6 
0.022  
3 
-0.130  
12 
The numbers in red are rankings. SR is the monthly Sharpe ratio, √12SR is the annualized Sharpe ratio, MSR stands for 
the modified Sharpe ratio on monthly basis, and ASR is the annualized autocorrelation adjusted Sharpe ratio. ASR is the 
difference between the annualized autocorrelation adjusted Sharpe ratio and the regular annualized Sharpe ratio (ASR-
√12SR). MSR represents the difference between the monthly modified Sharpe ratio and the regular monthly Sharpe ratio 
57 
 
(MSR- SR). UPR is the upside potential ratio, rf is the risk free rate, and mar is the minimum accepted return required by 
an investor. 
 
Table 5.3.1(b) the ranks of average ranks of hedge funds, equities, bonds and commodities performance  
Hedge Funds/indices Ranks 
in 
whole 
period 
Hedge Fund/indices Ranks 
in non- 
financial 
crises 
period 
Hedge Fund/indices Ranks 
during 
financial 
crises 
Risk Arbitrage 1 Equity Market Neutral 1 Managed Futures 1 
Distressed 2 Event Driven 2 Risk Arbitrage 2 
Global Macro 3 Event Driven Multi-
Strategy 
3 Dow Jones  corporate bond 3 
Event Driven 4 Distressed 4 Global Macro 4 
Event Driven Multi-
Strategy 
5 Multi-Strategy 5 Dedicated  Short Bias 5 
Hedge Fund Index 6 Hedge Fund Index 6 Distressed 6 
Multi-Strategy 7 Fixed Income Arbitrage 7 Long/Short Equity 7 
Long/Short Equity 8 Risk Arbitrage 8 Event Driven 8 
Dow Jones corporate bond 9 Long/Short Equity 9 Event Driven Multi-
Strategy 
9 
Managed Futures 10 Convertible   Arbitrage 10 Nasdaq composite 10 
Emerging Markets 11 Global Macro 11 S&P500 11 
Convertible   Arbitrage 12 Emerging Markets 12 Multi-Strategy 12 
Equity Market Neutral 13 Dow Jones corporate bond 13 Convertible   Arbitrage 13 
Fixed Income Arbitrage 14 Dow Jones-AIG 14 Philadelphia Gold&Silver 14 
S&P500 15 msci world 15 Equity Market Neutral 15 
Nasdaq composite 16 Nasdaq composite 16 Hedge Fund Index 16 
Philadelphia  Gold&Silver 17 Managed Futures 17 Fixed Income Arbitrage 17 
msci world 18 S&P500 18 msci world 18 
Dow Jones -AIG 19 Philadelphia  Gold&Silver 19 30yrs US treasury bond 19 
Dedicated   Short Bias 20 30yrs US treasury bond 20 Emerging Markets 20 
30yrs US treasury bond 21 Dedicated   Short Bias 21 Dow Jones-AIG 21 
 
The average rankings of hedge funds, equities, bonds and commodities are obtained by averaging their respective ranks as 
indicated by their comparative performance measures; that is the red figures in tables 5.3.1(a), 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. In 
calculating the average rankings, each performance measure is assigned equal weight. See Appendix on how the average 
ranks are obtained. 
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5.3.2 Non-financial crises period 
 
Same as for the whole period, only dedicated short bias and 30 years US Treasury bonds exhibit negative 
Sharpe ratios. Also, but for dedicated short bias, hedge funds generally have higher Sharpe ratios. 
Hedge funds and, equity, commodity and bond indices have positive upside potential ratio (UPR) 
and omega ratios. Whereas only dedicated short bias and 30 years US Treasury bonds exhibit negative 
Sortino ratios. With exception of dedicated short bias and managed futures, hedge funds have higher 
Sortino, UPR and omega ratios than do the equity, and bond and commodity markets. Unlike for the 
whole period, global macro show negative kappa ratio. 
Considering modified sharpe ratios (MSR) and Autocorrelation –adjusted Sharpe ratio (ASR), 
dedicated short bias and 30years US Treasury bonds exhibit negative (and the least) MSR and ASR 
during period of non-financial turmoil. Also, hedge funds (excluding managed futures and dedicated 
short bias) have higher MSR and ASR than do the equity, bond and commodity markets. 
 
In summary, same as for the whole period, most hedge funds outperform the equity, bonds and 
commodity indices during times of non-financial crises. Also, dedicated short bias and 30 years US 
Treasury bonds generally have the worst performance. Surprisingly, equity market neutral generally have 
the best performance in non-financial turmoil period, whereas it is one of the least performed strategies 
when considering the whole period. Equity market neutral, event driven (including event driven multi-
strategy and distress) relatively have the best performance.  The hedge fund index performed fairly 
compared to its constituent strategies. 
In reference to 5.3.1(b), about 85% of hedge funds strategies outperformed all the equity, bond 
and commodity indices considered, in contrast to 54% for the whole period. 
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Table 5.3.2 Performance Ratios of Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, Equity, Bond and 
Commodity indices in times of non-financial crises 
 SR Sortino UPR Omega Kappa MSR ASR 
mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=Rf mar=0 mar=Rf 
Hedge Fund 
Index 
0.470   
7 
1.279   
8 
1.055   
6 
1.620  
8 
1.414  
6 
4.748  
8 
3.939    
6 
0.812     
9 
0.679     
6 
0.202    
6 
1.373   
7 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
0.445   
9 
1.012 
10 
0.755  
11 
1.395  
10 
1.154  
11 
3.643  
11 
2.892  
11 
0.674   
10 
0.511   
10 
0.154  
11 
0.858  
14 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
-0.062  
21 
-0.044  
21 
-0.087  
21 
0.544  
21 
0.510  
21 
0.925  
21 
0.855  
21 
-0.035  
20 
-0.069   
20 
-0.035  
21 
-0.221  
21 
Emerging 
Markets 
0.341  
12 
0.746  
12 
0.658  
12 
1.155  
12 
1.076  
12 
2.823  
12 
2.573  
12 
0.499   
11 
0.443   
11 
0.151   
12 
1.169  
11 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
0.763   
1 
3.434   
1 
2.323   
1 
3.726  
1 
2.640  
1 
12.749 
1 
8.325    
1 
2.120     
1 
1.476     
1 
0.281    
1 
1.767   
4 
Event Driven 0.751   
2 
2.032   
2 
1.660   
2 
2.310 
2 
1.961  
2 
8.304  
2 
6.523    
2 
1.220     
2 
1.018        
2 
0.239    
2 
1.922   
2 
Distressed 0.708   
3 
1.775   
4 
1.487   
3 
2.059 
4 
1.791  
4 
7.257  
3 
5.904    
3 
1.041     
4 
0.890     
4 
0.225    
5 
1.804   
3 
Event Driven 
Multi-Strategy 
0.645   
4 
1.834   
3 
1.487   
4 
2.137  
3 
1.810  
3 
7.041  
4 
5.601    
4 
1.147     
3 
0.946      
3 
0.230    
3 
1.767   
5 
Risk Arbitrage 0.467   
8 
1.376   
6 
0.977   
9 
1.732 
5 
1.360  
8 
4.860  
7 
3.556    
8 
0.874     
6 
0.639      
8 
0.178    
9 
1.312   
8 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
0.568   
6 
1.379   
5 
0.983    
8 
1.710 
6 
1.33    
9 
5.165  
6 
3.774    
7 
0.878     
5 
0.639     
9 
0.179    
8 
1.308   
9 
Global Macro 0.408  
10 
0.958  
11 
0.823  
10 
1.285 
11 
1.163  
10 
3.924  
9 
3.421    
9 
-0.620   
21 
-0.538  
21 
0.172   
10 
1.435   
6 
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.404  
11 
1.194   
9 
0.989   
7 
1.617  
9 
1.424  
5 
3.818 
10 
3.274   
10 
0.839     
7 
0.702     
5 
0.228    
4 
1.038  
13 
Managed 
Futures 
0.109  
18 
0.239 
16 
0.171  
17 
0.761  
16 
0.705  
16 
1.458  
18 
1.320  
18 
0.175    
15 
0.126    
16 
0.052  
17 
0.432  
16 
Multi-Strategy 0.569   
5 
1.360   
7 
1.065   
5 
1.668  
7 
1.394  
7 
5.416  
5 
4.236    
5 
0.837     
8 
0.666     
7 
0.188    
7 
1.977   
1 
msci world 0.201  
15 
0.389  
15 
0.317 
15 
0.848  
15 
0.788  
15 
1.847  
15 
1.673  
15 
0.267   
14 
0.220   
14 
0.083  
15 
0.617  
15 
Nasdaq 
composite 
0.122  
16 
0.221  
18 
0.186 
16 
0.686  
17 
0.658  
17 
1.475  
17 
1.393  
16 
0.154    
16 
0.130   
15 
0.054  
16 
0.357  
17 
S&P500 0.120  
17 
0.222 
17 
0.170  
18 
0.679  
18 
0.634  
19 
1.486  
16 
1.367  
17 
0.152    
17 
0.117   
17 
0.048  
18 
0.351  
18 
Philadelphia  
Gold&Silver 
0.074  
19 
0.132 
19 
0.110  
19 
0.654  
19 
0.636  
18 
1.254  
19 
1.209  
19 
0.100    
18 
0.083    
18 
0.036  
19 
0.333  
19 
Dow Jones-
AIG 
0.235  
14 
0.453  
14 
0.382 
14 
0.906  
14 
0.844  
14 
1.999  
14 
1.826  
14 
0.325   
13 
0.275    
13 
0.100  
14 
1.222  
10 
30yrs US 
treasury bond 
-0.044  
20 
-0.018 
20 
-0.066  
20 
0.587  
20 
0.550  
20 
0.970  
20 
0.893  
20 
-0.014   
19 
-0.051   
19 
-0.026 
20 
-0.181  
20 
Dow Jones 
corporate 
bond 
0.261  
13 
0.638 
13 
0.461 
13 
1.075 
13 
0.928  
13 
2.461  
13 
1.986  
13 
0.429   
12 
0.317    
12 
0.110   
13 
1.041  
12 
SR is the monthly sharpe ratio,  MSR stands for the modified sharpe ratio on monthly basis, and ASR is the annualized 
autocorrelation adjusted sharpe ratio. UPR is the upside potential ratio, rf is the risk free rate, and mar is the minimum 
accepted return required by an investor. Numbers in red are rankings. 
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5.3.3 During financial crises 
 
Unlike for the whole and non-financial crises period, during financial crises, six hedge funds strategies 
(and hedge fund index) and, the equity, commodity and 30 years US Treasury bond indices have negative 
Sharpe ratios. 
Also, six strategies (and the hedge fund index) and, the equity, commodity and 30years US 
Treasury bond indices have negative Sortino and kappa ratios at either MAR equals zero or MAR equals 
risk free rate. These results are different from the obtained in whole and non-financial crises periods. 
Most hedge funds strategies relatively have higher Sortino and UPR ratios, where in emerging 
markets and fixed income arbitrage have one of the least Sortino and UPR ratios. 
The hedge funds index, emerging markets, event driven and distress funds, and all the equity and 
commodity indices have negative modified Sharpe ratios (MSR). Also, six hedge funds strategies (and 
the hedge fund index), the equity, commodity and 30 years US Treasury indices exhibit negative 
autocorrelation adjusted Sharpe ratios. This because their mean returns are less than the risk free rate. 
Moreover, about half or just the majority of hedge funds have higher MSR and ASR than do the hedge 
fund index, equity and commodity indices. Hedge funds do not dominate the other indices as they did for 
the whole period and times of non-financial turmoil. 
 
In summary, contrary to the whole period, the hedge funds index underperforms about the 
majority of its constituent strategies. Hedge funds have more negative performance ratios during financial 
crises than in either of the other periods. However, in relation to equity, commodity and bond indices 
(exception of Dow Jones corporate bond), managed futures, risk arbitrage, global macro, and dedicated 
short bias have relatively great performance during financial crises. Also, managed futures, dedicated 
short bias and Dow Jones corporate bonds’ performances relatively improved in financial times more 
than their relative performance in whole period and non-financial times. Hence, they may be suitable for 
portfolio diversification.  On the other hand, equity market neutral and emerging markets’ performances 
relatively dropped during financial crises. 30 years US Treasury bond index relatively performed very 
poor throughout. 
Although managed futures, risk arbitrage, global macro and dedicated short bias funds’ 
performance are among the best during financial crises, hedge funds do not dominate the equity, 
commodity or bond indices in times of financial crises than for the whole period and time of non-
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financial crises. Excluding Dow Jones corporate bonds, about 62% of hedge funds strategies performed 
better than the equity, bond and commodity indices, which is smaller than those obtained for the whole 
and non-financial crises periods. This is the case because equity (without MSCI world), Philadelphia gold 
& silver, and Dow Jones corporate bond indices outperform a couple of hedge funds strategies (including 
the hedge funds index). 
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Table 5.3.3 Performance Ratios of Credit Suisse/Tremont Hedge Fund index, Equity, Bond and 
Commodity indices during financial crises 
 SR Sortino UPR Omega Kappa MSR ASR 
mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf mar=0 mar=rf 
Hedge Fund 
Index 
-0.059  
16 
-0.016  
15 
-0.078 
16 
0.503  
10 
0.455  
10 
0.969  
15 
0.854  
16 
-0.012  
15 
-0.058  
16 
-0.036  
17 
-0.174  
16 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
-0.034 
14 
0.010  
13 
-0.038  
14 
0.369  
16 
0.328  
16 
1.028  
13 
0.895  
13 
0.006  
13 
-0.025 
13 
0.015 
9 
-0.069   
13 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
0.061    
5 
0.146 
5 
0.106   
5 
0.778   
3 
0.742    
2 
1.232  
7 
1.167  
5 
0.122  
5 
0.088   
5 
0.044  
8 
0.263     
5 
Emerging 
Markets 
-0.253 
20 
-0.254  
20 
-0.277 
20 
0.308  
18 
0.291  
18 
0.548  
20 
0.513  
19 
-0.182  
20 
-0.199  
20 
-0.743  
21 
-0.851  
21 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
-0.017 
12 
0.007  
14 
-0.018 
12 
0.168  
21 
0.148  
21 
1.042  
11 
0.894  
14 
0.004  
14 
-0.009 
11 
0.001  
10 
-0.050  
12 
Event Driven 0.023    
7 
0.092 
7 
0.028   
7 
0.466  
12 
0.416  
12 
1.247  
6 
1.071  
7 
0.058  
7 
0.018   
7 
-0.012  
15 
0.063     
7 
Distressed 0.039    
6 
0.110  
6 
0.048   
6 
0.474  
11 
0.427  
11 
1.302  
5 
1.125  
6 
0.068  
6 
0.030   
6 
-0.020  
16 
0.108     
6 
Event Driven 
Multi-Strategy 
-0.0005  
9 
0.062  
8 
-0.001  
9 
0.456  
13 
0.409  
13 
1.156  
8 
0.999  
9 
0.040  
8 
-0.0004  
9 
0.0005 
11 
-0.001    
9 
Risk Arbitrage 0.225    
1 
0.447 
2 
0.320   
2 
0.806   
2 
0.698    
3 
2.244   
1 
1.845  
1 
0.287  
2 
0.207   
2 
0.397  
1 
0.667     
2 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
-0.187 
18 
-0.146  
17 
-0.194  
17 
0.219  
20 
0.183  
20 
0.600  
19 
0.485  
21 
-0.095  
17 
-0.126  
17 
0.054 
7 
-0.439  
17 
Global Macro 0.113    
4 
0.226 
4 
0.168   
4 
0.715   
5 
0.665   
4 
1.463  
4 
1.338  
4 
0.169  
4 
0.126   
4 
0.076 
6 
0.306     
4 
Long/Short 
Equity 
0.001    
8 
0.049 
9 
0.001   
8 
0.592   
6 
0.555   
6 
1.091  
9 
1.002  
8 
0.036  
9 
0.001   
8 
0.0003  
12 
0.002     
8 
Managed 
Futures 
0.225    
2 
0.469  
1 
0.390   
1 
0.952   
1 
0.886   
1 
1.972  
2 
1.787  
2 
0.330  
1 
0.277   
1 
0.107 
4 
1.062     
1 
Multi-Strategy -0.040  
15 
0.029 
10 
-0.046 
15 
0.420  
14 
0.354  
15 
1.074  
10 
0.884  
15 
0.020  
10 
-0.032  
15 
0.194  
3 
-0.078  
14 
msci world -0.176 
17 
-0.177  
18 
-0.202 
18 
0.375  
15 
0.355  
14 
0.679  
17 
0.637  
17 
-0.133  
19 
-0.152  
19 
-0.123  
19 
-0.444  
18 
Nasdaq 
composite 
-0.004  
10 
0.014 
12 
-0.005 
10 
0.551   
7 
0.536   
8 
1.025  
14 
0.990  
10 
0.010  
12 
-0.004  
10 
-0.002  
13 
-0.012  
10 
S&P500 -0.012 
11 
0.019  
11 
-0.015 
11 
0.537    
9 
0.510   
9 
1.037  
12 
0.971  
11 
0.014  
11 
-0.011  
12 
-0.007 
14 
-0.028  
11 
Philadelphia 
Gold&Silver 
-0.022 
13 
-0.019  
16 
-0.034  
13 
0.548   
8 
0.536   
7 
0.967  
16 
0.941  
12 
-0.014  
16 
-0.025  
14 
-0.085  
18 
-0.158  
15 
Dow Jones-AIG -0.259 
21 
-0.272  
21 
-0.295  
21 
0.316  
17 
0.301  
17 
0.537  
21 
0.505   
20 
-0.203  
21 
-0.221  
21 
-0.222  
20 
-0.790  
20 
30yrs US 
treasury bond 
-0.190 
19 
-0.190  
19 
-0.218 
19 
0.303  
19 
0.287  
19 
0.615 
18 
0.569  
18 
-0.121 
18 
-0.140  
18 
0.100 
5 
-0.735  
19 
Dow Jones  
corporate bond 
0.160    
3 
0.355 
3 
0.240   
3 
0.723   
4 
0.628   
5 
1.963  
3 
1.617  
3 
0.229  
3 
0.156   
3 
0.231  
2 
0.561      
3 
SR is the monthly sharpe ratio,  MSR stands for the modified sharpe ratio on monthly basis, and ASR is the annualized 
autocorrelation adjusted sharpe ratio. UPR is the upside potential ratio, rf is the risk free rate, and mar is the minimum 
accepted return required by an investor. Numbers in red are rankings. 
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5.4 Performance rank correlation 
 Tables 5.4(a), 5.4(b) and 5.4(c) below represent the rank correlation of performance measures for whole, 
non-financial crises and financial crises periods, respectively. It is observed that the performance 
measures produce similar rankings. That is they exhibit very high rank correlation in the three periods 
analyzed. 
 However, upside potential ratio and Omega ratio do not show very high correlation with each 
other in the whole period analysis, as do the other performance measures. Also, modified Sharpe ratio 
exhibit lower rank correlation series with the other performance measures during financial crises. Hence, 
contrary to the whole and non-financial crises period, the modified Sharpe will not produce very similar 
ranks as do the other performance measures.   
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4(a) spearman rank correlation of performance measures for whole period analysis 
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Sortino mar=rf 0.994          
UPR mar=0 0.839 0.848         
UPR mar=rf 0.788 0.804 0.985        
Omega mar=0 0.94 0.94 0.675 0.612       
Omega mar=rf 0.952 0.96 0.72 0.665 0.988      
Kappa mar=0 0.977 0.975 0.873 0.83 0.881 0.904     
Kappa mar=rf 0.965 0.977 0.898 0.862 0.865 0.901 0.986    
SR 0.984 0.986 0.8 0.744 0.961 0.978 0.947 0.945   
MSR 0.931 0.936 0.922 0.895 0.778 0.818 0.969 0.978 0.895  
ASR 0.978 0.981 0.839 0.804 0.921 0.939 0.955 0.955 0.957 0.906 
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Table 5.4(b) spearman rank correlation of performance measures for non-financial crises period  
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Sortino mar=rf 0.974          
UPR mar=0 0.997 0.975         
UPR mar=rf 0.969 0.99 0.973        
Omega mar=0 0.987 0.982 0.984 0.961       
Omega mar=rf 0.979 0.991 0.979 0.97 0.995      
Kappa mar=0 0.923 0.888 0.923 0.891 0.879 0.871     
Kappa mar=rf 0.899 0.906 0.903 0.912 0.866 0.875 0.977    
SR 0.983 0.982 0.982 0.957 0.994 0.995 0.887 0.879   
MSR 0.964 0.988 0.965 0.995 0.958 0.968 0.888 0.912 0.955  
ASR 0.904 0.929 0.906 0.896 0.942 0.947 0.753 0.757 0.932 0.882 
 
 
 
Table 5.4(c) spearman rank correlation of performance measures during financial crises periods  
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Sortino mar=rf 0.97          
UPR mar=0 0.792 0.822         
UPR mar=rf 0.771 0.809 0.995        
Omega mar=0 0.982 0.955 0.725 0.704       
Omega mar=rf 0.955 0.982 0.858 0.847 0.947      
Kappa mar=0 0.999 0.969 0.787 0.765 0.981 0.953     
Kappa mar=rf 0.969 0.996 0.791 0.775 0.958 0.975 0.97    
SR 0.968 0.997 0.827 0.814 0.958 0.988 0.965 0.992   
MSR 0.608 0.53 0.342 0.3 0.592 0.477 0.626 0.565 0.518  
ASR 0.981 0.995 0.805 0.788 0.965 0.975 0.979 0.995 0.992 0.562 
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5.5 Alternative performance measures of hedge funds 
 
5.5.1 Market timing 
 
As concluded by a number of academic researchers, hedge funds do not exhibit market timing ability of 
their managers. As shown on Table 5.5.1, excluding equity market neutral, hedge funds show negative 
market timing measure. However, Ferson and Schadt (1996) argue that time variation in market risk and 
market premium is the cause of the funds’ negative market timing measures, and Edelen (1999) stated 
that the negative market timing results of previous studies are due to dilution of portfolio beta by excess 
cash holding. Hence, Edelen (1999) proposed the time series regression (similar to Treynor-Mazuy 
(1966)) to control for flow related timing performance, and found that hedge funds market timing 
measures are rather insignificantly different from zero. 
Considering hedge funds market (S&P500 index) exposure, hedge funds have very low and mostly 
insignificantly market betas. Asness , Krail and Liew (2001) argued that non-synchronous returns due to 
hedge funds’ illiquid asset holdings may underestimate hedge funds actual market exposures (betas). But 
emerging markets, global macro and managed futures exhibit negative market. Also, only dedicated short 
bias (-0.075) has negative alpha (that is underperform the market), with global macro (0.907) and distress 
funds (0.739) having the highest alphas. And nine hedge funds strategies significantly outperform the 
market. 
Hence, based on the OLS regression using CAPM with S&P500 index as market proxy, hedge funds 
generally exhibit positive significant alphas and low market exposure (beta). Conversely, Sæbø (2007) 
used the adjusted CAPM proposed by Dimson (1979) and Scholes and William (1977) to adjust for non-
synchronous movement in returns. And also found that most hedge funds exhibit positive alphas, fewer 
(about 22.4%) of which are significant relative to alphas obtained in CAPM regression. 
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Table 5.5.1 Market timing, market exposure and alphas of hedge funds for the period; January 1994 
to November 2008. 
 γp t-stats 
(γp) 
βM t-stats 
(βM) 
αi t-stats 
(αi) 
No. of observation 
Hedge Fund Index -0.013 
 
-1.620 0.020 0.370 0.592* 3.380 179 
Convertible   Arbitrage -0.017 -1.450 0.072 1.000 0.317 2.010 179 
Dedicated   Short Bias -0.003 -0.260 0.012 0.130 -0.075 -0.200 179 
Emerging Markets -0.025 -2.140 -0.029 -0.290 0.527 1.530 179 
Equity Market Neutral 0.001 0.130 0.009 0.520 0.387 1.630 179 
Event Driven -0.014 -2.340 0.016 0.350 0.657* 4.960 179 
Distressed -0.012 -2.110 0.028 0.600 0.739* 5.110 179 
Event Multi-Strategy -0.015 -2.280 0.004 0.070 0.623* 4.410 179 
Risk Arbitrage -0.008 -2.160 0.053 1.890 0.422* 4.700 179 
Fixed Income Arbitrage -0.014 -2.370 0.030 0.560 0.165 1.210 179 
Global Macro -0.017 -1.870 -0.028 -0.430 0.907* 3.940 179 
Long/Short Equity -0.010 -0.990 0.077 1.130 0.662* 2.980 179 
Managed Futures -0.001 -0.080 -0.070 -1.260 0.521 2.050 179 
Multi-Strategy -0.011 -1.570 0.065 1.440 0.444* 3.590 176 
γp represents market timing measure (coefficient of squared market premium) derived from regression of Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) market timing model. But βM and αι are obtained from OLS regression using CAPM. βM measures the 
sensitivity to the market premium and αI  is the estimated  abnormal return. S&P500 is used as the market proxy and t-stats 
is the t-statistics with robust standard errors. Significant coefficients at 5% (critical value 1.697) and 1% (critical value 
2.457) significance levels are bolded and starred, respectively. 
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CHAPTER SIX: LIMITATION AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Possible Bias in this thesis 
 
To begin with the shortcomings in this thesis, the results in analyzing the performance of Credit 
Suisse/Tremont Hedge fund index may be affected by self-selection and sample selection bias presented 
in chapter 4.2 (iii) and 4.2 (v). Hedge fund managers tend not to report to all databases (self-selection 
bias), and with Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index imposing specific listing criteria (sample 
selection bias), the Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index does not represent the hedge fund universe. 
Hence, the results obtained in this work are in reference to Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index. 
Also, liquidity bias presented in chapter 4.2 (iv) may affect the outcome of the analysis. Hedge 
funds hold illiquid assets which are difficult to price, and so gives room to fund managers to “manage” 
their monthly net asset value. A number of researchers concluded that hedge funds investment in illiquid 
securities may be the reason behind the autocorrelation of their returns. The first and second lagged 
autocorrelation of the various asset classes is presented in table 5.1.2. However, autocorrelation-adjusted 
sharpe ratio is used to minimize this effect on the conclusion arrived at. 
Finally, S&P500 has been used as the market proxy in verifying hedge fund managers’ market 
timing and security selection skills presented in tables 5.5.1. However, the market proxy may affect the 
result since there exist differences between S&P500 and other indices, such as MSCI world index. 
 
 
6.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
The financial markets have experienced significant up and down market movement within the period of 
January 1994 to November 2008. The summary statistics of Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index, 
including the equity, bond and commodity indices were first considered. Same as  previous studies, 
hedge funds exhibit higher mean return to volatility ratios, higher negative skewness and positive kurtosis 
(excess kurtosis) than do the equity, bond and commodity indices. Also, hedge funds exhibit higher 
significant positive autocorrelation and Jarque-Bera statistics than do the other indices considered. 
The correlation between the hedge funds strategies for the whole period (January 1994-November 
2008) shows moderate or fair correlation, as opposed to Kat and Lu (2002). Managed futures and 
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dedidicated short bias show negative (low) correlation with the other hedge fund strategies for whole 
period and during financial crises. Whereas high correlation is observed between the event driven and its 
sub-strategies (distress, multi-strategies and risk arbitrage). Moreover, correlations between the hedge 
fund strategies are obtained for the whole period and during financial crises. I found in general that the 
correlation between the strategies slightly increases during financial crises (averagely from 0.27 in whole 
period to 0.30 during financial crises). Liang (2003) explains that higher correlation between hedge funds 
during financial crises is due to liquidity squeeze, wherein fund managers are compelled to invest in 
limited securities and follow similar strategies. Managed futures and dedicated short bias maintained low 
(mostly negative) correlation with other strategies during financial crises. 
 Furthermore, the correlation between the hedge funds and equity, bond and commodity were 
analyzed in chapter 5.2.3. I found that excluding MSCI world index, hedge funds are loosely correlated 
to the equity indices over the entire period and during financial crises. Hedge funds generally exhibit low 
correlation with bonds, but show moderate correlation with Dow Jones corporate bond index (averagely 
0.22) during financial crises. On the other hand, hedge funds exhibit low (mostly negative) correlation 
with Philadelphia gold & silver index, but moderately correlated to Dow Jones-AIG commodity index. In 
all, for the whole period and during financial crises, hedge funds show higher correlation with MSCI 
World (0.36, 0.39), Dow Jones –AIG (0.27, 0.33) and Dow Jones corporate bond (0.16, 0.22) than with 
the other indices for comparison (the equity, bond and commodity indices considered). 
In chapter 5.3, risk-adjusted performance measures such as Sharpe, Sortino, upside potential, 
Omega, Kappa, modified Sharpe and autocorrelation-adjusted Sharpe ratios were used to investigate and 
rank the performance of Credit Suisse/Tremont hedge fund index in comparison to the equity, bond and 
commodity indices in three periods; the entire period, financial crises and non-financial crises periods. 
For the entire period, hedge funds (but for dedicated short bias and in some cases equity market neutral) 
outperformed the equity, bond and commodity markets. Also, risk arbitrage, distress, global macro, event 
driven, and event driven multi-strategy exhibit the best performance among the other strategies. 
However, Dow Jones corporate bonds outperformed many hedge funds strategies for the whole period. 
The performance analysis in periods of non-financial crises maintains that most hedge funds strategies 
outperformed the equity, bond and commodity indices. Same as for the entire period analysis, dedicated 
short bias and 30 years US treasury bonds generally have the worst performance, whereas equity market 
neutral and event driven (including event driven multi-strategy and distress) relatively performed best. It 
is observed that hedge funds are not immune to financial crises. This is shown by more negative 
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performance ratios during financial crises than in either of the analyzed periods (as shown in chapter 5.3). 
Interestingly, managed futures, dedicated short bias and Dow Jones corporate bonds’ performance 
relatively improved during financial crises compared to whole and non-financial crises periods. 30 years 
US Treasury bonds relatively performed very poor throughout, while the hedge fund index 
underperforms about the majority of its constituent strategies during financial crises than it did for the 
whole and non-financial crises periods. In all, relative to the equity, bond and commodity indices 
considered, hedge funds performed better for non-financial and whole periods than during financial crises 
(table 5.3b shows the average performance ranks of the asset classes for the three analysis periods). I also 
came to the conclusion that the choice of performance measures might have not significantly affected the 
rankings of the asset classes (hedge funds and the other indices considered). 
Finally, hedge fund managers’ market timing and security selection skills were investigated using 
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) model. Same as previous studies, I found evidence of hedge fund managers’ 
security selection skills (significant positive alphas), but no evidence of fund manager’s market timing 
abilities. The model also suggests that hedge funds are loosely exposed to the market (S&P500 index) 
movements. 
In recommendation, more emphasis should be put on hedge funds valuation since hedge funds 
invest on illiquid asset, large use of derivates and other complex strategies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Appendix 1. Ranks for whole period analysis and how average ranks are obtained 
Hedge 
Fund/strategies 
 
Sortino 
mar=0   
Sortino 
mar=rf 
UPR 
mar=0 
UPR  
mar=rf 
Omega 
mar=0 
Omega 
mar=rf 
Kappa 
mar=0 
Kappa 
mar=rf 
SR MSR ASR Average 
ranks 
Hedge Fund 
Index 
6 6 4 4 8 8 4 5 7 4 7 5.73 
Convertible   
Arbitrage 
11 11 16 18 11 11 11 11 10 11 13 12.18 
Dedicated   
Short Bias 
20 20 12 12 20 20 20 20 20 19 20 18.45 
Emerging 
Markets 
12 12 10 11 14 14 12 12 13 12 11 12.09 
Equity Market 
Neutral 
14 13 21 21 6 7 16 16 12 21 12 14.45 
Event Driven 3 3 5 6 3 2 5 4 2 5 3 3.73 
Distressed 2 2 3 3 2 1 3 3 1 3 2 2.27 
Event Driven 
Multi-Strategy 
4 5 7 7 4 4 6 6 4 6 5 5.27 
Risk Arbitrage 1 1 1 2 1 3 2 2 3 2 1 1.73 
Fixed Income 
Arbitrage 
13 14 19 20 12 13 13 15 14 14 14 14.64 
Global Macro 5 4 2 1 7 5 1 1 6 1 4 3.36 
Long/Short 
Equity 
9 8 6 5 10 9 9 7 8 7 10 8.00 
Managed 
Futures 
10 10 10 9 13 12 10 10 11 10 8 10.27 
Multi-Strategy 7 7 9 10 5 6 7 8 5 8 9 7.36 
msci world 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 18 17 17 18 17.18 
Nasdaq 
composite 
16 15 15 14 16 16 15 13 16 13 15 14.91 
S&P500 15 16 13 15 15 15 14 14 15 15 16 14.82 
Philadelphia  
Gold&Silver 
19 18 14 13 19 18 19 17 18 16 17 17.09 
Dow Jones -AIG 18 19 18 16 18 19 18 19 19 18 19 18.27 
30yrs US 
treasury bond 
21 21 20 19 21 21 21 21 21 20 21 20.64 
Dow Jones 
corporate bond 
8 9 8 8 9 10 8 9 9 9 6 8.45 
The entries in red are the average ranks which I used to rank the performance of the asset classes for whole, non-financial crises and 
financial crises period in table 5.3.1b in chapter 5.3.1 above. The average ranks are the sum of their respective ranks divided by the 
number of performance measures (11). 
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